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I. INTRODUCTION 
Scholars worldwide have clearly demonstrated the inability of the 
Bretton Woods Institutions (the "BWis") to promote authentic 
sustainable development. 1 Some have criticized the BWis for their 
1. The Bretton Woods Institutions encompass the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. In July 1944, delegates from forty-four allied nations gathered at the 
Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED NATIONS MONETARY AND FINANCIAL 
CONFERENCE Vol. I at 5 (1948). They gathered to create institutions that would regulate the 
international monetary system and reconstruct the international relations. Id. at 5-7. The 
meeting resulted in the creation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development ("IBRD"), and the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"). See LEE E. 
PRESTON & DUANE WINDSOR, THE RULES OF THE GAME IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLICY 
REGIMES FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 132- 33 (2d. ed. 1997) (explaining that the IMF was 
established to carry out exchange, reserve, and short-term loan functions normally 
associated with "bank," while the IBRD is essentially a "Fund" for providing long- term 
loans). The purpose of these institutions was to stabilize the global economy and fund 
reconstruction of countries recovering from World War II. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, 
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, 12 (2003). See DEPT. OF PUBLIC INFO., EVERYONE'S 
UNITED NATIONS 364- 65 (9th ed. 1979) (explaining that the IBRD was established to assist 
in the reconstruction and development of members' territories by facilitating the investment 
of capital for productive purposes; to promote private foreign investment and to supplement 
it by providing loans for productive purposes; and to promote growth of international trade 
and maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging international 
investment for the development of the productive sources of the Bank's members). The 
IMF was established with the purposes of facilitating international monetary cooperation; 
promoting exchange rate stability; assisting in the establishment of multilateral payment 
systems; eliminating foreign exchange restrictions; providing loans to nations experiencing 
balance of payments issues; all for the purpose of creating conditions for strong economic 
growth. Id. at 55. The IMF created an orderly basis for international currency exchange, 
and established both stabilization and adjustment mechanisms. See LEE E. PRESTON & 
DUANE WINDSOR, THE RULES OF THE GAME IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLICY REGIMES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (2d. ed. 1997); see also EDWARDS. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER, 
THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETTON WOODS 21, 22 (1973). The IBRD provided loans to 
support reconstruction in war-damaged countries, and later promoted economic growth and 
development in nations with low per-capita income. See LEE E. PRESTON & DUANE 
WINDSOR, THE RULES OF THE GAME IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLICY REGIMES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (2d. ed. 1997); see also EDWARD S. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER, 
THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETTON WOODS 21, 22 (1973). The World Bank actually refers 
to two banks: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the 
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inability to rehabilitate, evolve, and reform their respective policies. 2 
Some scholars argue that the core of this problem is the voting 
structures of the BWis. 3 Additional critiques address the lack of 
transparency and limited participation by developing countries in 
formulation of BWis' policies; both deficiencies have resulted in fewer 
developing countries benefiting from these policies.4 
International Development Association. See WORLD BANK, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/about (last visited Dec. 3, 2013). The World Bank Group 
refers to the two banks and three other agencies: the International Finance Corporation, the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes. See id. 
2. See What Are the Main Concerns and Criticisms about the World Bank and IMF?, 
BRETTON WOODS PROJECT, available at 
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/item.shtml?x=320869 (last visited Dec. 3, 2013) 
("Criticism of the World Bank and the IMF encompasses a whole range of issues but they 
generally centre around concern about the approaches adopted by the World Bank and the 
IMF in formulating their policies, and the way they are governed. This includes the social 
and economic impact these policies have on the population of countries who avail 
themselves of financial assistance from these two institutions, and accountability for these 
impacts."). 
3 . ARIEL BUIRA, CHALLENGES TO THE WORLD BANK AND IMF: DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
PERSPECTIVES l (2003); see also JOHN E. CHEN, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
IN GLOBALIZATION: THE CHALLENGES OF REFORM 81 (2003); M. PANIC, GLOBALIZATION AND 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC WELFARE 228 (2003); WILLIAM K. TABB, ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN 
THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 184, 373 (2004); V. SPIKE PETERSON, A CRITICAL REWRITING 
OF GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: INTEGRATED, REPRODUCTIVE AND VIRTUAL ECONOMIES 3, 
8 (2003); JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE ANTI- GLOBALIZATION MOVEMENT, THE GLOBALIZATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT READER: PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE 356 
(2007); JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALISM'S DISCONTENTS, THE GLOBALIZATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT READER: PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE 295 (2007); 
Messner et al., Governance Reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions and the U.N. 
Development System 6 (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Dialogue on Globalization, Occasion Paper 
No. 18, 2005). The IMF and the World Bank have a weighted system of voting. Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa12.htm#5 (last visited Dec. 3, 2013) 
[hereinafter Articles of IMF] (explaining subsection a); WORLD BANK, Voting Powers, 
available at, http://go.worldbank.org/VKVDQDUClO (last visited Dec. 3, 2013) 
[hereinafter Voting Powers] ( explaining that the IMF' s voting bylaws state that each 
member is guaranteed 250 votes, plus one additional vote for each part of its quota equal to 
100,000 special drawing rights. Within the World Bank, a new member country is allotted 
250 votes plus one additional vote for each share it holds in the World Bank's capital stock); 
see also ICSID Basic Documents, ICSID, available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/lCSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=Ru 
lesMain (last visited Dec. 3, 2013) (discussing how the ICSID allocates its voting within its 
Administrative Council; all decisions are taken by a majority of the votes cast, and each 
member must vote in person). 
4. See Ngaire Woods, Governance in International Organizations: The Case for 
Reform in the Bretton Woods Institutions, INT'L AND FIN. MONETARY ISSUES (2008), 
available at http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-
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Acknowledging these critiques, this article will argue that current 
BWI policies must be fundamentally redesigned, since many are archaic 
and others are counter-productive to integral sustainable development in 
the current global economy. Further, the article will argue that the 
dominant nations in the BWI have forced their political agendas on the 
rest of the world while hiding behind the veil of these multilateral 
funding institutions. 5 
In making these arguments, the article will begin with a review of 
the origin, purpose, and structures of the BWis and offer a brief critique 
of their voting structures. Next, this article will analyze and critique the 
neoliberal revival of the classical laissez-faire liberal ideology now on a 
global scale, and show how it has played out in the Asian financial 
crisis, the current world financial crisis, and the on-going debt crisis. 
Two case studies will then be provided and discussed: one on 
Argentina; and a second on Sub-Saharan Africa. The paper will then 
analyze other institutions' alternative solutions to the ongoing problems 
with the BWI, specifically the Monterey Consensus, developed by the 
United Nations Financing for Development process, the "Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries," created by the World Bank, and the G-206, a 
policy-advising group of 20 countries claiming to represent the most 
"systemically significant" world's economies. Finally, a conclusion 
will summarize this article's critique of the BWis and suggest 
alternative lines of strategy. 
Part II first reviews the events and global instability that led to the 
Bretton Woods Conference creating the early BWis, and then explains 
content/uploads/Governance%20and%20Decision-Making.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2013) 
("While pressure for good governance has been magnified by the policy role of the [IMF 
and World Bank, also known as the] Bretton Woods twins, neither institution has adequately 
reformed [the] core aspects of accountability and participation."); see also Madeline Baer, 
Water Privatization and Civil Society in Bolivia, Addressing the Democratic Deficit of 
International Organizations, Annual Meeting of International Studies Association (2006), 
available at 
http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p _ mla _ apa _research_ citation/I /0/0/4/0/pages 100408/p 
100408-1.php (last visited Dec. 3, 2013) (providing another critique which charges that 
recent BWis' globalization policies favoring privatization- allowing private lenders to 
come in and charge higher rates-are further aggravating the problem for developing 
countries). 
5. See, e.g., Nico Kirsch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power 
and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 369, 382 (2005). 
"Most predominant states have been active forces behind the development of international 
law, and they have made extensive use of the international legal order to stabilize and 
improve their position." Id. 
6. See About the G20, G20.0RG, available at http://www.g20.org/about_ G20 (last 
visited Dec. 4, 2013); see infra Part IV.C. 
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the Bretton Woods Conference itself and the global response to the 
creation of the BWis. 7 Part II then concludes with a critical analysis of 
the IMF and World Bank voting structures. 8 
Part III begins by showing how neoliberal agendas influence the 
policies of the BWis through vote and governance. 9 A historical 
analysis of the rise of the contemporary neoliberal ideology is then 
provided. 10 At the heart of this has been the University of Chicago 
School of Economics, led by the late Professor Milton Friedman, and 
the Austrian School of Economics. Both were highly influential in 
developing a new and problematic model of so-called global 
'development' for the BWis. Part III then examines loan conditionality; 
the mechanism by which the BWis pressure other countries into 
accepting neoliberal ideas. 11 Part III concludes by providing a critical 
analysis of the neoliberal ideology in its application to the Asian 
Financial Crisis, 12 along with case studies showing its impact on 
Argentina and Sub-Saharan Africa. 13 
Part IV analyzes alternative solutions, which have been put forth 
by various global endeavors. It begins with an examination of the 
Monterrey Consensus, the product of an international conference held in 
Monterrey, Mexico. 14 Part IV then examines The Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries, a program created by the World Bank and the IMF, 
which currently classifies forty developing countries with high levels of 
poverty and debt which are eligible for special assistance. 15 Finally, the 
G-20 is a group of twenty countries that hold periodic meetings to 
review and promote discussions pertaining to the promotion of 
international financial stability and the governance of the world 
economy.16 
7. See infra Parts II.A-C. 
8. See infra Parts II.D-E. 
9. See infra Part III.A. 
10. See infra Part III.B. 
11. See infra Part III.C. 
12. See infra Part III.D.3. 
13. See infra Part III.D.1-2. 
14. See Inaamul Haque & Ruxandra Burdescu, Monterrey Consensus on Financing for 
Development: Response Sought.from Economic Law, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 219 
(2004); see infra Part IV.A. (stating the conference in Monterrey, Mexico comprised of over 
fifty Heads of State, two hundred Ministers of Finance, and the Heads of the United 
Nations, IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization). 
15. See Eric A. Friedman, Debt Relief in 1999: Only One Step on a Long Journey, 3 
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 191, 191- 94 (2000); infra Part IV.B. 
16. See What is the G20, G20.0RG, available at 
http://www.g20.org/about_g20/g20_members (last visited Dec. 3, 2013) (providing that the 
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Finally, Part V concludes that the BWis, due to their lending 
policies and governing structures, have restrained true global 
development. The BWis have served as impediments to authentic 
development and these institutions are in need of fundamental reform 
including overhauls to their policies, voting systems, and governance 
structures. Part V proposes alternative strategies for authentic 
sustainable development through other multilateral global institutions. 
II. THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS 
A. Worldwide Economic Instability After World War I 
A world trading system was practically nonexistent during the 
Great Depression because there were no major multilateral trading 
agreements or international agencies at the time to regulate or promote 
trade relations between countries. 17 Developed countries pursued 
nationalistic policies of closing their borders to imports in an effort to 
protect their domestic productions and shift unemployment to the 
nations from which they formerly imported. 18 At the mercy of their 
"European Masters," 19 developing countries suffered from these 
isolationist policies, as they were cut off from their trading partners and 
no longer had external purchasers for their nationally produced goods. 20 
group consists of both developed and developing countries, heads of state and government, 
finance ministers and central bank governors); see infra Part IV.C. 
17. KENT ALBERT JONES, WHO'S AFRAID OF THE WTO? 68 (2004) (discussing how the 
world trading system after World War I collapsed during the Great Depression partly 
because most countries established bilateral trade agreements, thus precluding any sort of 
broad multilateral trade agreement). 
18. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 15, 107 (2003) 
(explaining that these policies became known as "beggar- thy- neighbor" policies). Beggar-
thy- neighbor policies are a government's protectionist course of action taken to discourage 
imports by raising tariffs and instituting nontariff barriers, usually to reduce domestic 
unemployment and increase domestic output. Id. This term is sometimes applied to 
competitive currency devaluation. Id. at 107. 
19. Id. at 11- 13 (asserting that contrary to its original policies, the IMF lends funds 
only if countries "engage in policies like cutting deficits, raising taxes, or raising interest 
rates that lead to a contraction of the economy."). 
20. CHARLES P. KlNDLEBERGER, THE WORLD In DEPRESSION: 1929- 1939, 26-28 (1973) 
(discussing how beggar- thy- neighbor tactics put countries in a worse-off position since 
they led to retaliation among countries). National economic interests trumped international 
cooperation. Id. In addition to the British government's micromanagement of the 
agricultural industry, the 1932 Import Duties Act imposed an ad valorem tariff on almost all 
goods, with only minimal exceptions. Id. Further, the Ottawa Agreements Act granted a 
duty exemption for all British Commonwealth Countries; this led to the economic 
discrimination against Great Britain's neighboring countries. Id. at 85- 86 (explaining 
further that the duty exemption granted reciprocity on duty- free imports and exports to all 
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B. The Bretton Woods Conference 
In July 1944, delegates from forty-four allied nations21 gathered at 
the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, with 
the objective of creating institutions that, through a unified system of 
purpose, policies, and rules, would regulate the international monetary 
system while simultaneously reconstructing the international relations 
which had begun to foster before World War II. 22 Although all of the 
British Commonwealth Countries). Germany responded to the international financial crisis 
by establishing its own beggar- thy- neighbor policies in the form of exchange controls in 
1931, and by 1933, several state import boards were granted the power to regulate trade 
through import quotas and tariffs. Id.; B. N. GHOSH, GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND 
REFORMS: CASES AND CAVEATS 379 (2001) (explaining how Germany and France increased 
border protection and domestic market regulations). Parallel to the United Kingdom and 
Germany, most developed countries introduced exchange- control systems. DEREK How ARD 
ALDCROFT, EUROPE'S THIRD WORLD: THE EUROPEAN PERIPHERY IN THE INTERWAR YEARS 61 
(2006) (listing countries that established exchange controls during the l 930's as: Bulgaria 
1931, Estonia 1931, Greece 1931, Hungary 1931, Latvia 1931, Lithuania 1935, Poland 
1936, Romania 1932, Spain 1931, Turkey 1930, and Yugoslavia 1931 ). Those that did not 
introduce exchange systems became members of trade blocs similar to that of the British 
Commonwealth; these blocs were characterized by preferential trading agreements that 
benefited bloc members and discriminated against nonmembers. EUROPE IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 1500 TO 2000 156 (Derek Howard Aldcroft & Anthony Sutcliffe 
eds., 1999) ( explaining how exchange control systems were also an issue in the 
development of South American and African countries). Thirteen of the fourteen countries 
using these systems in the IMF were Latin American countries. See id.; ELIZABETH 
HENNESSEY, A DOMESTIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND: 1930- 1960 85 (1992) ( explaining how 
African countries fared differently under the exchange control systems depending upon their 
relationship with the British Commonwealth). 
21. The Department of State, Proceedings and Documents of United Nations Monetary 
and Financial Conference Vol. I at 5 (1948) [hereinafter Bretton Woods Conference Vol. I]. 
The forty- four nations were comprised of: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, 
Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippine Commonwealth, Poland, Union of South Africa, Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Id. 
22. See id. at 5- 7; DEPT. OF PUBLIC INFO, EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS 365 (9th ed. 
1979). The draft documents presented to delegates at the Bretton Woods conference were 
presented in four different versions: the U.S. version, the U.K. version, new material, and 
material taken from the Monetary Fund proposal. EDWARD s. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER, 
THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETTON WOODS 21 (1973). Least developed members, including 
European countries damaged during World War II, held a greater interest in development of 
the IBRD than the IMF. Id. Therefore, when the first week of the conference primarily 
focused on development of the IMF, delegates feared the IBRD would not be established. 
Id. Stable monetary conditions are the cornerstone to successful lending and a precondition 
to the membership in the BWis. Id.; JACQUES J. POLAK, THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF: A 
CHANGING RELATIONSHIP l (1994). An attempt to reconcile openness and trade expansion 
with economic and employment stabilization, the agreement was "an unprecedented 
7
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forty- four nations were present, the Bretton Woods agreement was 
largely negotiated between Britain and the United States of America. 23 
The meeting resulted in the creation of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD"), and the International 
Monetary Fund ("IMF"). 24 
Despite the peaceful northern New Hampshire setting for the 
Bretton Woods conference, the meeting set the stage for future conflict 
not only between the United States and Great Britain, but also between 
historical differing economic policies. At the conference, Great 
Britain's Lord John Maynard Keynes ("Keynes") sought to retain the 
imperial preferential system and bilateral trading, while the United 
States' Harry Dexter White ("White") preferred an open, non-
discriminatory multilateral trading system. 5 Fundamentally, Great 
experiment in international economic constitution building." G. JOHN IKENBERRY, THE 
POLITICAL ORIGINS OF BRETTON WOODS, A PERSPECTIVE ON THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM 
155 (1993). 
23. The United States of America and Britain were the two major Western powers 
from World War II. See IKENBERRY, supra note 22; see also ERIC HELLEINER, STATES AND 
THE REEMERGENCE OF GLOBAL FINANCE: FROM BRETTON WOODS To THE 1990s 33 (1996) 
("The Bretton Woods negotiations are often portrayed as a battle of wills between Keynes 
and White."); M.J. Stephey, A Brief History of Bretton Woods System, TIME (Oct. 21, 2008), 
available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599, 1852254,00.html (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2013). 
24. LEE E. PRESTON & DUANE WINDSOR, THE RULES OF THE GAME IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY: POLICY REGIMES FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSlNESS 132- 33 (2d. ed. 1997) 
( explaining that the names of these two institutions are somewhat confusing, since the IMF 
was established to carry out exchange, reserve, and short- term loan functions normally 
associated with "bank," while the IBRD is essentially a "Fund" for providing long- term 
loans). The IBRD was established on December 27, 1945 with the intent to: 
"[A]ssist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by 
facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes; to promote private 
foreign investment and, when private investment is not readily available on 
reasonable terms, to supplement it by providing loans for productive purposes out of 
its own capital funds; and to promote the balanced growth of international trade and 
the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging 
international investment for the development of the productive sources of the Bank's 
members." 
DEPT. OF PUBLIC INFO., EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS 364-65 (9th ed. 1979). Membership 
to the IBRD is open to all members of the IMF. Id. at 364. The IMF was established with 
the purposes of facilitating international monetary cooperation; promoting exchange rate 
stability; assisting in the establishment of multilateral payment systems; eliminating foreign 
exchange restrictions; providing loans to nations experiencing balance of payments issues; 
all for the purpose of creating conditions for strong economic growth. Id. at 55. 
25. IKENBERRY, supra note 22, at 156. Britain's position was to secure employment 
and economic stabilization within its borders for its citizens. See id. at 157. Formal 
negotiations on international trade took place in Havana, Cuba three years later under the 
formulation of the International Trade Organization. TYRONE FERGUSON, THIRD WORLD 
8
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Britain recognized a need for some post-war regulation on the 
international scene; it recognized that the potential exploitation by the 
war's victors of the defeated Axis Powers, as a means of financing the 
reconstruction of war-tom European nations, could lead to another 
global disaster.26 The United States' influence and power ultimately 
won out, for the BWis were mostly modeled after White's proposals. 27 
C. After the Bretton Woods Conference 
Throughout the 1960s, the BWis faced three great obstacles: 
decolonization, threats of decreasing international liquidity, and a 
weakening gold standard. 28 In partial response, the World Bank created 
the International Development Association ("IDA")29 in 1960, which 
AND DECISION MAKJNG IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 25 (1988). The 
multilateral organization taking the place of the ITO was the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade ("GA TT") in 194 7. See id. Analysts consider the Bretton Woods system's 
"triadic structure" to include the GATT, IMF, and IBRD, encompassing trade, monetary, 
and financial relations. Id. The GA TT was intended to reverse protectionist and 
discriminatory trade practices such as the imperialistic approach. See General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. AS, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, art. XV [hereinafter 
GATT]. 
26. See JOHN D. CIORCIARI, The Lawful Scope of Human Rights Criteria in World 
Bank Credit Decisions: An Interpretive Analysis of the IBRD and IDA Articles of 
Agreement, 33 CORNELL INT'L L. J 361-69 (2000) (describing the negotiations leading up to 
the creation of the BWis that took place prior to the end of WWII); World War II, U.S. 
HISTORY, available at http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1661.html (last visited Dec. 1, 
2013) ( explaining that the Allies were determined not to repeat the mistakes of World War 
I); Paul Wachtel, Understanding the Old and New Bretton Woods 6 (New York University, 
Stern School of Business Working Paper No. 2451, 2007), available at 
http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/emplibrary/Florence_paperjan4.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2013). 
Keynes proposed an international bank and a radical institutional system for management of 
currencies, including creation of a common world- unit of currency. Id. He envisioned that 
these institutions would manage international trade through regulation, and prove strong 
incentives for countries to avoid substantial trade deficits while fostering economic growth. 
Id. Meanwhile, White's proposal called for less regulation. Id. White proposed limited 
government interference and gave more emphasis to market based solutions. Id. 
27. Sabine Dammasch, The System of Bretton Woods: A Lesson from History, 5, 
available at http://www.hiddenmysteries.org/money/policy/b-woods.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 
2013). 
28. See Jong II You, The Bretton Woods Institutions: Evolution, Reform and Change, 
in GOVERNING GLOBALIZATION: ISSUES AND INSTITUTIONS 209, 210-12 (2000) (explaining 
that SDR's were created in 1969 to respond to the shortage of .international liquidity); 
Historical Gold Prices - 1833 to Present, NATIONAL MINfNG ASSOCIATION, available at 
http://www.nma.org/pdf/gold/his_gold_prices.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2013) (listing the 
price of gold from 1833 to present day). 
29. International Development Association, Articles of Agreement and Report of the 
Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the 
Articles of Agreement, Sept. 24, 1960, at 21 [hereinafter IDA Articles of Agreement]. 
9
Wolff: Failure of the International Monetary Fund
Published by SURFACE, 2013
80 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 41:1 
was praised as "the most significant moment in institutional expansion 
of the BWis toward a poverty-focused approach."30 When Robert 
McNamara arrived as World Bank President in 1968, the Bank's 
fundraising efforts grew.31 Envisioning a larger, more active, and more 
efficient bank, McNamara established lending targets which, due to 
acceleration of the Bank's growth, justified reorganization in 1973.32 
The IDA,33 led by the United States, assisted the world's most 
impoverished countries, which were ineligible for bank loans, by 
offering concessional or soft loans. 34 Shifting its attention to newly 
30. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: Third World Social 
Movements and International Institutions, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 529, 552 (2000) (explaining 
how the IDA led to the further establishment of additional development institutions because 
its framework, lending primarily to Third World countries, helped the World Bank become 
a true international institution). 
31. Id. at 140, 180; JOCHEN KRASKE, ET AL., BANKERS WITH A MISSION: THE 
PRESIDENTS OF THE WORLD BANK, 1946- 1991 at 175 (1996); PHILIPPE LE PRESTRE, THE 
WORLD BANK AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE 59 (1989). McNamara's stated 
reorganization goal was to: 
"[r]eplace the ... procedure in which unrelated project loans, considered in isolation 
from another, filter up through the levels with a five year program based on systems 
analysis and overall development strategy, taking account of relative priorities 
among countries and within sectors of each country." 
Id.; see also Enrique R. Carrasco & M. Ayhan Kose, Symposium: Social Justice and 
Development: Critical Issues Facing the Bretton Woods System: Income Distribution and 
the Bretton Woods Institutions: Promoting an Enabling Environment for Social 
Development , 6 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. I, 18 (1996). Lending to alleviate 
poverty in developing countries expanded considerably after Robert McNamara took over 
the Bank's helm in the late 1960's; structural adjustment lending followed in the late 
1970's. Carrasco & Kose, supra; see also KRASKE, supra, at 140 (discussing how during 
McNamara's presidency, the World Bank staff tripled, growing from 1,600 to 5,700 
people). 
32. SEBASTIAN MALLABY, THE WORLD'S BANKER 26-27 (2004) (discussing the 
divergence of the World Bank from a conservative lender to an ambitious bank set on 
offering loans to countries even if they could not afford to pay them back). The creation of 
the IDA reflected a shifting mind- set of the World Bank's largest shareholders as they saw 
the tide of independence sweeping Africa, combined with the height of the Cold War, as an 
opportunity to aid others in the hopes that those governments aided through the IDA would 
not become communist. Id. 
33. See IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 29 (discussing how the United States 
and a group of the Bank's member countries set up an agency that would lend to the poorest 
countries with the most favorable terms possible). 
34. See DEVESH KAPUR, JOHN P. LEWIS & BERNARD WEBB, THE WORLD BANK: ITS 
FIRST HALF CENTURY VOL. 2 PERSPECTIVES 204, 207 (1997) (explaining how the United 
States encouraged the World Bank during the establishment of IDA to extend lending to 
low- income countries, become involved in development problems such as agricultural 
productivity, and take the lead in matters relating to industrial and trade liberation in India); 
see e.g., OECD, Concessional Loans, available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5901 (last visited Dec. I, 2013) (defining 
10
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industrializing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the World 
Bank expanded its reach into new sectors.35 The IDA's funding was 
derived from the contributions of wealthier nations, IBRD income, and 
borrowers' credit repayments. 36 Due to the fact that funds were initially 
insufficient to meet the IDA's commitments-because of the 
unlikelihood of substantial replenishment due to the balance of payment 
deficit experienced by wealthier states-there emerged a certain 
skepticism about progress, which contributed to delays associated with 
recuperating the funds. 37 
As time passed, however, a significant and problematic shift 
emerged in the IDA's operational philosophy. It moved away from the 
World Bank's original theory of market-based lending, and instead 
adopted a new theory favoring loans to the poorest countries. 38 
concessional loans as "loans that are extended on terms substantially more generous than 
market loans; the concessionality is achieved either through interest rates below those 
available on the market or by grace periods, or a combination of these. Concessional loans 
typically have long grace periods."). 
35. See Martin A. Weiss, CRS Report/or Congress: The World Bank's International 
Development Association (!DA) 2, 6 (Apr. 1, 2008), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/104719.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2013) 
(explaining how concerns of the World Bank loans being unaffordable to low- income 
countries prompted the establishment of the IDA); see also International Development 
Association; What is !DA?, THE WORLD BANK, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/ida/ida-15-mid-term-review.html (last visited Dec. I, 2013). 
"The IDA- 15 replenishment raised funds for poor countries for the three-year period 
between July 2008 and June 2011. These are critical years for countries trying to achieve 
the U.N. Millennium Development Goals since it takes time for projects to be completed 
and yield measurable results." Id. Forty- five donor countries made pledges toward this 
replenishment. Id. 
36. See generally KRASKE, supra note 31, at 142-43 (explaining that IDA 
commitments dropped in 1968 from $400 million per year to $107 million). This became a 
problem of mobilizing resources within the IDA. Id. 
37. See generally id. This became a problem of mobilizing resources within the IDA. 
Id. at 140; see id. at 180; EDITH KUIPER & DRUCILLA K. BARKER, FEMINIST ECONOMICS AND 
THE WORLD BANK: HISTORY, THEORY AND POLICY 17 (2006) ("A critical junction in the 
Bank's history was the appointment as its president of Robert McNamara .... During his 
tenure . . . the Bank shifted from an emphasis on infrastructure to agriculture and rural 
development, in an attempt to address people's basic needs, particularly the rural poor."). 
38. These loans were then furnished at cheaper rates, under the guise of giving "World 
Bank credits as a useful tool for propping up sympathetic governments." See Carrasco & 
Kose, supra note 31, at 3. 
Income inequality came under scrutiny during preparatory meetings for the World 
Summit for Social Development (Social Summit). Observers noted that although 
living standards in developing countries have improved over the past two decades, 
disparities within countries- the subject of this article- are likely to rise, with the 
largest gaps occurring in South Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. 
Id.; see also DIGUMARTI BHASKARA RAO, WORLD SUMMIT FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 198 
11
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Originally, the cornerstone of the Bretton Woods system had been 
the United States' policy of buying and selling gold accordin¥ to an 
official price set at the behest of foreign monetary authorities. 9 The 
Bretton Woods Articles of Agreement, Article IV, defined the unit of 
the international monetary system as either the U.S. dollar or gold of a 
specified weight and fineness. 40 However, the vulnerability of the gold 
standard began to show in the 1960s. Later, in August of 1971, 
President Richard Nixon officially suspended the automatic conversion 
of dollars into other currencies.41 Although solutions to fixing the gold 
standard for the international monetary system were proposed, 
ultimately the Bretton Woods gold-standard system collapsed. This led 
to the development of Special Drawing Rights ("SDRs")42 in 1969.43 
(1998) ( quoting former secretary general Boutros- Ghali); LE PRESTRE, supra note 31, for a 
discussion on the BWis involvement in the development debate of the 1960's and 1970's. 
39. MICHAEL D. BORDO & BARRY EICHENGREEN, Bretton Woods and the Great 
Inflation 28 (Soc. Sci. Res. Network, Working Paper No. w14532, 2008) (explaining how 
first, there was an asymmetric adjustment between deficit and surplus countries, which led 
to a deflationary bias); see FRITZ MACHLUP, REMAKING THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
SYSTEM: THE RIO AGREEMENT AND BEYOND 7- 8 (1968) (explaining how the United 
Kingdom and United States conflicted over the gold standard because the United States and 
White wanted it, but the United Kingdom and Keynes saw the system as imposing 
intolerable restraints on member countries). Gold supplies were inadequate to finance the 
growth of world output, and to serve as gold cover to back national currencies. BORDO & 
EICHENGREEN, supra. Shifts of currency holdings between London and New York risked a 
confidence crisis in the weak sector, while a shift between the key currencies and gold 
occurred when foreign holders of key currency balances staged runs on banks where reserve 
centers' could not convert their outstanding liabilities into gold. Id. 
40. BAHRAM GHAZI, THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK GROUP AND THE QUESTION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (2005) ( explaining how other IMF members also had to keep the value of 
their currency within one percent of the par value). If a change of margin was needed, IMF 
members had to undergo thorough discussions with other members and obtain their consent 
before implementing the measure. Id. 
41. See id; see also THE ECONOMIST, A Brief History of Funny Money, Jan. 6, 1990, at 
21 (providing a brief account of why the Bretton Woods system ended and a larger debate as 
to which exchange- rate system has worked best in the world economy). 
42. Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.HTM (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) [hereinafter 
SDRs] (discussing the makeup of the SDR). The SDR is a potential claim on the freely 
usable currencies of IMF members where holders of SDRs can obtain currencies in 
exchange for their SDRs through the arrangement of voluntary exchanges between IMF 
members, or through an IMF designation of members with strong external positions to 
purchase SD Rs from members with weak external positions. Id.; Held in Reserve: A Brief 
Guide to the IMF's "Currency", THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/13447239 (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) (discussing the 
redefinition of the SDR as a basket of currencies consisting of the value of a fixed amount 
of the Japanese yen, U.S. dollar, pound sterling, and Euro). 
43. Held in Reserve, supra note 42 (discussing how various sources of liquidity 
became unreliable and inadequate toward financing the growth of output and trade). In the 
12
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/4
2013] Failure to Achieve Integral Development 83 
Essentially, SDRs are "[i]nternational reserve asset(s) [ which] 
supplement existing reserve assets."44 
SDRs have been criticized as funny money, as nothing more than a 
fancy term for allocated credits doled out by the IMF to member 
countries that have no value, but can be exchanged for subsidized loans 
to non-reserve currency countries.45 Because SDRs are allocated in 
proportion to countries' existing IMF quotas, when the 02046 countries 
authorized the IMF to issue $250 billion in new SDRs in 2009, up to 
approximately $170 billion could still land in the reserves of wealthy 
late I 950's the world's monetary gold stock became insufficient. Id. The supply of U.S. 
dollars was dependent on the U.S. balance of payments, which hedged on the "vagaries of 
government policy and the confidence problem." Id. The probability of all dollar holders 
being able to convert their dollars into gold at the fixed price declined" and "outstanding 
dollar liabilities held by the rest of the world monetary authorities increased relative to the 
U.S. monetary gold stock." Id.; Joseph Gold, The "Sanctions" of the International 
Monetary Fund, 66 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 737 (1972) (discussing the special drawing rights 
amendment to the IMF Articles, with a focus on sanctions); William Bernhard, J. Lawrence 
Broz & William Roberts Clark, The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions, 56 INT'L 
ORG. 693, 700 (2002) (discussing the gold overhand and lax U.S. macroeconomic policies). 
44. See Editorial, The G- 20 's Funny Money, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2009, at A22 
(Originally, to participate in this system, a country needed official reserves, government or 
central bank holdings of gold, and widely accepted foreign currencies that could be used to 
purchase the domestic currency in foreign exchange markets. After the Bretton Woods 
system collapsed, the major currencies shifted to a floating exchange-rate). 
45. Held in Reserve, supra note 42 (discussing the April 2, 2009 authorization of $250 
billion in fresh SDRs). Another example is China; its SDR reserves, already nearly $2 
trillion, will go up $9.3 billion. Id.; see SDRs, supra note 42 (discussing how the IMF 
allocates SDRs). Under the Articles of Agreement, the IMF may allocate SDRs to members 
in proportion to their respective IMF quotas using two kinds of allocations: general and 
special. SDRs, supra note 42. General allocations are based on a long- term global need to 
supplement existing reserve assets, and have only been made three times, where special 
allocations occur in the form of a one- time allocation of SD Rs enabling all members of the 
IMF to participate in the SDR system on an equitable basis. Id. This corrects the inequity 
for countries that joined the IMF after 1981, as they had never received an SDR allocation. 
Id. The three general allocations were distributed in 1970 through 1972, 1979 through 
1981, and on August 28, 2009; the special allocation was implemented on September 9, 
2009. See id. 
46. See Held in Reserve, supra note 42 (explaining that the United States needs 
Congressional approval to part with its share). The last proposed SDR allocation in 1997 
failed because only 75% of the votes accepted the proposal, and the IMF requirement is 
85% of votes in order for the allocation to be ratified. Id. The United States, with nearly 
seventeen percent of the votes in the IMF, never approved. Id.; see also G- 20 Funny 
Money, supra note 44 (explaining how SDRs cost U.S. taxpayers $330 million per year). 
Had the 1997 resolution been approved, U.S. exposure would have been about $12 billion 
with a $750 million annual cost to taxpayers. Id. Although IMF financing does not show 
up on the annual United States expenditure, the SDR credits make countries in turmoil, such 
as Syria, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Venezuela, and Burma, eligible for substantial amounts of 
money. Id. 
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countries such as the United States, Japan, and Britain. 47 Although the 
IMF hopes the reserve-rich countries will lend their shares to those 
countries in greater need, this is not a guarantee required by the current 
system.48 
D. The Voting Structures 
1. International Monetary Fund 
The voting structure of the IMF was a debated topic at the outset 
by the principal founding nations.49 Despite the desire of many 
countries to institute purely economic criteria in determining how votes 
would be distributed, the votes were allocated based on the relative 
economic importance of member-states to the international economy. 50 
In order to appease smaller economic nations, the weighted voting 
system was bifurcated to include the allocation of a certain number of 
"basic" votes, which would be guaranteed to each member, thus giving 
smaller countries a "sense of participation," and tempering the 
overriding control that would be exercised by larger countries. 51 Also, 
while majority-voting for decision-making was to be a requisite in the 
IMF's Articles, the United States successfully advocated that certain 
decisions should require higher majorities for approval. 52 Despite the 
47. Held in Reserve, supra note 42; see also G- 20 Funny Money, supra note 44. 
48. See Voting Powers, THE WORLD BANK (Jan. 10, 2010), available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/VKVDQDUClO (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Voting 
Powers] (providing links to voting statuses of the IBRD, IFC, IDA, and MIGA listed by 
country and executive director). 
49. See J. KEITH HORSEFIELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945- 1965: 
TWENTY YEARS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION 59 (1969) ("It would be an 
advantage if the proposed Union could be brought into existence by the United States and 
the United Kingdom as joint founder- States ... [t]he management and the effective voting 
powers might adhere permanently in the founder States."). Michael Tanzer, Globalizing the 
Economy: the Influence of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, MONTHLY 
REV., Sept. 1, 1995 at 1 (discussing how the United States was ensured to be the dominant 
voice, having thirty- six percent of the subscribed capital). 
50. FERGUSON, supra note 25, at 60--61. 
51. Tanzer, supra note 49; see FERGUSON, supra note 25, at 60-61 (explaining that 
although this requirement effectively gave the United States a unilateral veto power, it was 
added to the Fund ' s Articles albeit in a more limited version in which the high, special 
majorities would be reserved for a few important decisions). 
52. Articles of Agreement of International Monetary Fund. Art. V, s. 5- 7, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). Repurchase of 
currency and dealings of special drawing rights are some examples of instances which 
require super majority approval. See id. The voting structure provides that, when a vote is 
needed to waive any conditions on loan eligibility or even to declare a member country 
ineligible for IMF funds, the member's votes shall be increased by each 400,000 special 
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attempt to evenly allocate a certain percentage of votes to smaller 
countries, subsequent IMF practice, and the increase in the number of 
smaller economies as members of the IMF, has led to a reduction in the 
proportionality of basic votes as compared with total voting power. 53 
To fully analyze the voting requirements and their effects on the 
many nations, an analysis of the IMF's overall governance structure and 
implementation is required. 54 The IMF is governed by a Board of 
Governors that meets once each year and consists of one governor and 
one alternate governor for each member country. 55 The day-to-day 
business of the IMF is handled by a twenty-four member Executive 
Board of Directors. 56 There are cases, such as in Africa, where dozens 
of countries are represented by just one director. 57 
The IMF has two ministerial committees: the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee ("IMFC"), 58 and the Development 
drawing rights of net sales and reduced for each 400,000 special drawing rights of net 
purchases. Id. at Art. XII, s. 5. 
53. Hector Torres, Reforming the International Monetary Fund- Why its Legitimacy is 
at Stake, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 443, 446 (2007) (explaining Torres' experience within the 
Fund and that the imbalance in voting power leads to the dilution of a true consensus voting 
forum, thereby falsifying by effect the Fund's frequent statements that its decisions are 
mostly taken by consensus); see e.g., IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF 
Board of Governors, INT'L MONETARY FUND (July 11, 2011), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx. See FERGUSON, supra note 25 
( emphasizing that votes are distributed according to quotas and quotas are meant to reflect 
wealth. G7 countries alone have 41. 72% of votes and 28 countries hold over 61 % of the 
voting power at both the Fund and the World Bank). 
54. Alexander Mountford, Independent Evaluation Office Background Paper of the 
International Monetary Fund, The Formal GovernanceStructure of the Monetary Fund 
(March 2001 ), available at http://www.imf.org/external/about/govstruct.htm (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2013). 
55. Id. See Factsheet: A Guide To Committees, Groups, and Clubs, INT'L MONETARY 
FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm#IC (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) 
[hereinafter IMF Factsheet] (providing a general discussion of the IMFC and explaining that 
larger economies, mirroring the weighted-voting philosophy, are represented by individual 
directors while smaller economies-developing countries- are grouped together and 
represented by a single director). During meetings, the governors vote on various 
amendments to the structure and operation of the IMF. Each governor, usually the minister 
of finance or the head of the central bank within his or her country, is appointed by his or 
her respective member country. Id. 
56. See IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power, INT'L MONETARY FUND, available 
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). 
57. IMF Factsheet, supra note 55. 
58. See id. (discussing the Development Committee); See also William N. Gianaris, 
Weighted Voting in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 14 FORDHAM 
INT'L L.J. 910, 914 (1990) (The IMFC discusses matters of concern affecting the global 
economy.). 
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Committee (jointly with the Bank). 59 The ministerial composition of 
these two committees is basically identical to the composition of the 
respective Executive Boards. 
2. World Bank 
The planning involved in creating the World Bank was 
significantly less rigorous than that of the planning required for the 
creation of the IMF. 60 White's initial plan for a postwar stabilization 
fund and international bank included voting in proportion to stock 
holding,61 however, his ultimate plan proposed voting power by the 
number of shares held by each government. 62 Ultimately, subscriptions 
to the capital of the Bank determined voting power, and thus, the World 
Bank's use of the weighted voting system is almost identical to that of 
the IMF. 63 Despite a revision of the voting structure in 2010, the six 
largest economies of the 187 member countries still maintain 38.61 % of 
the total vote, with the United States having 15.85% alone. 64 
Similar to the governing structure of the IMF, the World Bank's 
59. See IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power, INT'L MONETARY FUND, available 
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). The 
Development Committee advises the Boards of Governors of the IMF and the World Bank 
on issues related to economic development in emerging and developing countries. 
Governance Structure, INT'L MONETARY FUND, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/about/govstruct.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2013);. The Boards 
of Governors appoints or elects the Executive Board. IMF Executive Directors and Voting 
Powers, supra. The Executive Board takes care of the daily business of the IMF. Id. 
60. MASON & ASHER, supra note 1, at 14-16 (explaining how the Inter-American 
Bank combined the functions of an ordinary commercial bank, intergovernmental bank, and 
international stabilization fund). 
61. Id. at 16- 17 (explaining that no government could hold more than twenty- five 
percent of the total voting power). 
62. Id. at 11. 
63. Gianaris, supra note 58, at 917-18, 927- 28 ( discussing further that although 
membership in the World Bank is contingent upon membership in the IMF, the reverse is 
not true). 
Id. 
Like the IMF, each member has 250 basic votes plus one additional vote for each 
share of capital equivalent to U.S. $100,000 subscribed . . . While most states 
wanted a large quota in the IMF, giving them enhanced drawing rights, the less 
developed countries preferred a lower quota in the World Bank because the amount 
they could borrow was independent of their capital contribution. To resolve the 
controversy, the United States agreed to accept a larger quota in the World Bank 
than in the IMF. 
64. Members, INT'L MONETARY FUND, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2013). The 
United States currently has 16.75% of the voting power. Id. 
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powers are vested in its Board of Governors. 65 Another analogous 
feature is that the Board of Executive Directors for the World Bank has 
all of the day-to-day powers. The Articles of Agreement sets forth the 
structure and powers of the Board of Governors and the Board of 
Executive Directors; of the twenty-four Executive Directors, the five 
largest shareholders, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. 66 Interestingly enough, each of the eleven Presidents 
of the World Bank, also known as the Chairman of the Board of 
Executive Directors, have been the appointed Executive Director of the 
United States. 67 
E. Critique of the Voting Structures 
Both IMF member countries and critics of the IMF have attacked 
the IMF' s voting structure, characterizing it as outdated. 68 In response 
to such criticisms, the IMF issued proposals to change the voting 
structure, such as a one-time boost in voting power to under-represented 
countries and an increase in the developing nations' voting share 
coupled with a respective decrease in the voting share of some of the 
industrial nations, especially those in Europe. 69 Yet, these proposed 
65. Board of Governors, IMF, Articles of Agreement, art. XII, Section 2. See also THE 
WORLD BANK, available at http://go.worldbank.org/IA6NF9XJ40 (last visited Oct. 24, 
2013). (The World Bank's Board of Governors consist of one governor and one alternate 
governor appointed by each member country.). 
66. About the World Bank, THE WORLD BANK, 
http:! /web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTSITETOOLS/0,,contentMDK:2014 7 4 
66-menuPK:344189-pagePK:98400-piPK:98424-theSitePK:954 74,00.html (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2013). (Each appoints an individual Executive Director while the remaining 
nineteen Executive Directors represent the other 182 member countries.). 
67. Id. 
68. Jonathan Gregson, The World Bank: Trying Times, GLOBAL FIN., Oct. 2007, at 24 
( discussing how emerging countries want a greater say within the World Bank's voting 
structure). India and Brazil are examples of emerging economies which have criticized the 
IMF's voting structures as being outdated and who believe that as a result of their respective 
increased contributing to the global economy, they should henceforth be provided with 
voting powers which correlate. Id. 
69. Anthony Faiola, Nations Cast Plan for Expanded IMF: Role to Deepen in Global 
Economy, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2009, at A18 (explaining the preliminary plan that, by 
January 2011, would give more voting power to emerging financial powers like Brazil and 
China). Emerging economies would have more long- term say over the IMF's policies if 
voting rights were redistributed, "giving a 50-50 split to the developing and developed 
worlds." Id.; IMF Board of Governors Approves Quota and Related Governance Reforms 
(Sept. 18, 2006), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2006/pr06205 .htm (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2013) (explaining how on September 18, 2006, the IMF's Board of 
Governors adopted a resolution that aimed to align the IMF's quota shares with members' 
positions within the world economy). Mexico, China, Korea, and Turkey, which were 
characterized as underrepresented countries, gained an increase in quota shares. Id. But see 
17
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changes were not without their own sets of criticism. 70 
The "basic vote" of the IMF was originally a compromise to give 
developing countries a specified amount of votes on top the allocated 
"quota-based" votes.71 Since 1944, the IMF's quota has increased by a 
factor of thirty-seven while its membership has quadrupled. 72 
Originally, basic votes accounted 11.3 percent of all votes but that has 
been reduced to merely 2.1 percent. This drastic decline in the power of 
the basic vote "has substantially shifted the balance of power in favor of 
large-quota countries .... Consequently, the voice of small countries in 
discussions has been substantially weakened and their participation in 
decision-making made negligible."73 The result of the weighted voting 
structure is that developed countries have 60.4 percent of the IMF's 
voting power, while only accounting for twenty percent of the IMF's 
membership and fifteen percent of the world's population.74 
Realizing a need for some sort of voting reform, the IMF is in the 
process of instituting amendments to the overall voting structure after 
the Board of Governors approved such reform on December 15, 2010.75 
Intergovernmental Group of Twenty- Four on International Monetary Affairs and 
Development Communique (Oct. 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/cm/2008/101008.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) 
(explaining that an agreement was not reached on an increase in the voting power of 
developing and transition countries). It was stressed that broader objectives were necessary 
to achieve a realignment of voting shares because the current proposal at the time was a 
piece- meal approach. Id. 
70. Christopher Swann, Critics Assail IMF Plan on Developing Nations' Voting 
Share, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2008, at D03 (discussing a 2008 plan that intended to give 
more voting authority to developing countries). The voting share of developing countries 
was to rise to forty- two percent from about 40.5% while the voting share of advanced 
economies would have fallen from 59.5% to 58%. Id. Former IMF officials, such as former 
chief economist at the U.S. agency for International Development Colin Bradford and 
former executive vice president with the Inter- American Development Bank Nancy Birdsall 
signed a letter authored by former assistant Treasury secretary Edwin M. Truman expressing 
their displeasure with the proposed reforms because they fell short in "addressing the 
challenges facing the IMF and its evolution toward a truly global institution. Id. 
71. FINANCE, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE IMF 290 (James M. Boughton & Domenico 
Lombardi eds., 2009) (stating that the compromise was to allocate 250 "basic votes" to each 
member country). 
72. DAVID WOODWARD, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, 
G-24 DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, IMF VOTING REFORM: NEED, OPPORTUNITY AND OPTIONS l 
(2007). 
73. BUIRA, supra note 3, at 15. 
74. WOODWARD, supra note 72, at 2. 
75. See IMF Quota and Governance Publications, IMF, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/quotas/pubs/index.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013). Even 
more drastic then the 2008 reforms, the Board of Governors, on December 15, 2010, passed 
a package of far-reaching reforms, completing the "14th General Review of Quotas." Id. 
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In 2008, reforms passed increasing basic votes to 5.502 percent of total 
votes, which results in 7 41 basic votes for each 187 member countries 
of the IMF.76 Additionally, the reform enabled Executive Directors 
representing seven or more members to each appoint a second Alternate 
Executive Director following the 2012 regular elections of Executive 
Director.77 Unfortunately, despite the much needed reform, developed 
countries still maintain a large percentage of the IMF's voting power; 
the seven G7 countries alone maintain 43.12 percent of all the votes 
while the top ten quota-based countries, including the G7 countries, 
have 52.13 percent of all the votes. 78 
The World Bank has experienced the same sort of criticisms, 
notwithstanding these criticisms developed and large emerging 
economies are asserting pressure on the World Bank desiring more 
influence on the institution.79 Recently, the World Bank sought to 
pursue a reform program where developing countries would get at least 
forty-seven percent of the voting shares in the institution, although fifty 
The 14th General Review of Quotas will: ( 1 )double quotas from approximately SDR 238.4 
billion to approximately SDR 476.8 billion, (about US$767 billion at current exchange 
rates); (2) shift more than 6 percent of quota shares from over-represented to under-
represented member countries; (3) shift more than 6 percent of quota shares to dynamic 
emerging market and developing countries (EMDCs); (4) significantly realign quota shares. 
China will become the 3rd largest member country in the IMF, and there will be four 
EMDCs (Brazil, China, India, and Russia) among the 10 largest shareholders in the Fund, 
and preserve the quota and voting share of the poorest member countries. This group of 
countries is defined as those eligible for the low-income Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Trust (PRGT) and whose per capita income fell below US$1,135 in 2008 (the threshold set 
by the International Development Association) or twice that amount for small countries. Id. 
76. Factsheet: IMF Quotas, IMF (Sept. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm (last visited Oct. 21 2013). 
77. Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Recommends Reforms 
to Overhaul Quota and Voice (Mar. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2008/pr0864.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 20 l 3)(stating 
that the Executive Directors of African countries will receive additional Alternate 
Directors). 
78. See IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, 
INT'L MONETARY FUND, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx (last vistited Oct. 21, 2013) 
(stating that Canada, France, Germany, United States, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, China, 
Russia, and Saudia Arabia have a combined 1,312,43 7 votes out of the 2,517 ,646 total 
votes); Group of Seven, INFOPLEASE, available at 
http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/ A082 l 954.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (listing 
the G7 countries as Canada, France, Germany, United States, Italy, Japan, United 
Kingdom). 
79. Press Release, The World Bank, The World Bank, World Bank Reforming to Meet 
New Challenges, Zoellick Says (Oct. 6, 2009), available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/5JYWTSK5UO (last visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
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percent has been argued to be the optimal percentage. 80 
That being pursued, the voting structure still results in unfair 
situations. For example, the World Bank granted a loan on the 
condition that a country's water and sanitation services are privatized.81 
The country then sells its water and sanitation industries to a private 
consortium, which is financed by the IFC, a branch of the World 
Bank. 82 When the people of the country start complaining about sharp 
price increases due to privatization, the country is forced to tum to the 
ICSID, a branch of the World Bank, to dispute the situation.83 So the 
weighted voting structure allows larger countries to impose their 
policies through the World Bank, which in this scenario results in the 
World Bank Group controlling the ( 1) conditions for which a country 
may take a loan, (2) the financing for the privatization of certain 
services, and (3) the dispute settlement. 84 This scenario happened at El 
Alto (Bolivia) in 2004-05.85 
Although reforms to promote good governance were stressed as 
early as 1996,86 the IMF's governance did not begin a major reform 
80. Id. (discussing a speech made by World Bank Group President Robert B. Zoellick 
at the beginning of the 2009 Annual Meetings of the World Bank and IMF in Istanbul, 
Turkey). The World Bank's shareholders supported giving developing countries at least a 
4 7 percent share of the voting shares, yet Zoellick called for developing countries to have a 
50% share. Id.; see Robert B. Zoellick, President, The World Bank Group, Remarks at 
Board of Governors of World Bank Group Annual Meeting: The World Bank Group 
Beyond the Crisis (Oct. 6, 2009) (discussing the World Bank's pursuit of an ambitious 
program of reform). 
81. ERIC TOUSSAINT, THE WORLD BANK A CRITICAL PRIMER 3 (Sylvain Dropsy ed. , 
Elizabeth Anne trans., Pluto Press, 2008). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 3-4. 
84. See id. 
85. Id.; see Maude Barlow, Securing the Right to Water in Bolivia, BLUE PLANET 
PROJECT (Mar. 23, 2010) available at 
http://www. b lueplanetproj ect.net/?s=Securing+the+ Right+to+ Water+in+ Bo livia&searchsub 
mit= (last visited on Oct. 21, 2013). "[C]itizens in El Alto, Bolivia [struggled] to regain 
control of their local water supply from multinational corporate giant, Suez .... As a 
condition for a World Bank loan, the public water system in El Alto was privatized in 1997 . 
Eight years later, despite promises of expanded water services, the private company Aguas 
del Illimani (Suez is the major shareholder) had failed to deliver water to 200,000 people in 
El Alto and had no plans to do so in the future .... In January 2005, after a general strike 
and public protests demanding the immediate withdrawal of Suez from Bolivia and for the 
government to investigate the company's actions, the Bolivian government decided to 
cancel its contract with Aguas del Illimani .... Despite this initial victory, the Bolivian 
government, under pressure from the Inter- American Development Bank, the World Bank 
and German Corporation GTZ, announced its intention to create a supposed 'New Model' of 
Public- Private Partnership where Suez would continue to hold 35% of the shares." Id. 
86. See INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., THE WORLD BANK 
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process until 2006. 87 A 2009 Committee on IMF' s Governance Reform 
report described the drawbacks to the current governance framework as: 
legitimacy and effectiveness; political voice; the executive board itself; 
overlaps and gaps; and mandates. 88 To rectify the drawbacks, the 
Committee recommended enhancement of clear leadership, enablement 
of effective executive decision-making, and an increase in membership 
accountability. 89 Emerging economies are not in favor of the reforms 
sought by the IMF. 90 
PARTICIPATION SOURCEBOOK (1996), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP /IB/1996/02/01 /000009265 
3961214175537/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf(last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (showing reform 
ideas proposed in 1996, which suggested that increased participation by developing 
countries was necessary). 
87. Governance Structure, INT'L MONETRARY FUND, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/about/govstruct.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) ( explaining the 
governance reform ideals between 2006 and 2008). A committee was appointed to assess 
the adequacy of the IMF's current framework. Id. The committee on IMF Governance 
Reform was appointed by Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn on September 4, 
2008. Id.; see INT'L MONETARY FUND, COMMITTEE ON IMF GOVERNANCE REFORM FINAL 
REPORT (Mar. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/2009/govref/032409.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) 
[hereinafter COMMITTEE ON IMF] (explaining the findings of the committee); Press Release, 
Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss- Kahn Welcomes Experts' 
Report on Fund Decision Making (Mar. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr0988.htm (last visited October 31, 2013) 
(discussing the makeup of the eight- person committee). 
88. COMMITTEE ON IMF, supra note 87, at 7- 10. Changes are reforms that are 
implemented and take years to go into effect, and many nations are not following through 
with their respective portions of the bargain. Id. at 7. "High- level political representation 
on a decision- making body that provides strategic and policy direction, and discusses 
macroeconomic and financial policy coordination, is needed." Id. at 9. The Executive 
Board, while in actuality is a body of high professional and technical capacity, is treated by 
its members as a position on international civil servitude, rather than a capacity of political 
representation, therefore the members are often removed from the actual policy- making. Id. 
at 9. Regarding the overlaps and gaps, in order for a governing body to be efficient there 
needs to be clarity in the roles and responsibilities delineated to each area of the 
governmental framework. Id. at 9. "Components of institutional decision-making-
namely, the legislative function, the executive function, and a means of measuring 
performance and holding the executive accountable- are insufficiently delineated and 
assigned. The IMFC lacks the mandate to take strategic decisions; the Board is too stretched 
in day- to---day operational decisions to be able to set broad strategic directions; and there are 
few explicit systems for measuring management and board performance and holding them 
accountable." COMMITTEE ON IMF, supra note 87, at 9. 
89. Id. at 10. 
90. Lesley Wroughton, Emerging nations stand firm on IMF vote reform, REUTERS 
NEWS, Aug. 5, 2009 (explaining that emerging economies want voting shares realigned 
before governance reforms are tackled). Emerging powers want voting shares to reflect 
their shares within the global economies before the governance is reformed because the 
emerging economies fear that a decision- making ministerial council backed by the current 
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The World Bank's governance, in its role as the premier 
multilateral banking institution, has been inherently critiqued, as it is the 
sole global institution of the sort.91 As a result of weathering the heavy 
criticism, the World Bank has evolved vastly since its inception and has 
become a pioneer in terms of accountability. 92 The World Bank's 
governance structure is in a constant state of review and reformation. 93 
As such, the World Bank instituted an independent review by 
experienced individuals, which the World Bank hopes will aid in 
strengthening its aims of becoming more accountable, agile, effective, 
inclusive, innovative, and financially sound. 94 
That independent review, headed by former Mexican President 
Ernesto Zedillo, emphasized the lack of accountability at the top-at the 
IMF's powers would delay basic reforms emerging countries want. Id. 
91. Ngaire Woods, The Challenge of Good Governance for the IMF and the World 
Bank Themselves, World Development (May 2000) 17- 18 ( discussing the critiques as the 
greater influence in research direction and results by large shareholders, and the World 
Bank's Anglo-Saxon approach to economics including the homogeneity in the World 
Bank's staffing). An example of influence is that in the 1980's, the Reagan administration, 
Germans, and British played a role in squelching research on debt issues. Id. The Anglo-
Saxon approach consisted of the staffing of the agency being dominated by English 
speaking United States' citizens. Id. Fluency in English advanced employees within the 
organization. Id. 
92. Id. at 6. In 1993, the World Bank became the first multilateral organization to 
create an independent inspection panel for public accountability. By 1998, that panel had 
received thirteen requests for inspection. Id. 
93. Press Release, The World Bank, Outside Review Supports World Bank Group 
Reform (Oct. 21, 2009) ( on file with author), available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/2I98FYWNJO (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (explaining that the 
reforms that are already underway deal with financial capacity, the strengthening of 
management accountability, the leadership selection process, expanding voice, and the 
restructure of the World Bank's governing bodies). Financial measures such as the injection 
of paid- in capital were developed to reform financial capacity. Id. The World Bank is 
doing an institutional review of independent evaluation entities to strengthen management 
accountability. Id. The leadership selection process was reformed so selection of the World 
Bank Group President is now merit- based, transparent, and open. Id. The World Bank's 
voice has been expanded through a new chair for Sub- Saharan Africa, an increase in 
developing countries' shares in IBRD, and a raise in developing and transition countries' 
voting power. Id. The World Bank Group's governing bodies were restructured to improve 
Board operations and client services. Id. 
94. See Press Release, The World Bank, supra note 93 (explaining that World Bank 
Group President Robert B. Zoellick created the High Level Commission on Modernization 
of World Bank Group Governance in October 2008 which did an external review of the 
World Bank Group's governance). Headed by former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo, 
the Commission made five recommendations: 1) restructure the World Bank Group's 
governing bodies; 2) strengthen the World Bank Group's resource base; 3) strengthen 
management accountability; 4) reform the leadership selection process; and 5) enhance 
voice and participation Id. 
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level of the Executive Board and Senior Management. 95 The 
accountability problem is exasperated by the Executive Board having 
three counterproductive functions: political representation, 
management, and oversight. 96 The report calls for more division of 
labor and responsibilities via a restructure of the current governance 
structure. 97 It is suggested that the Board of Directors be elevated to a 
"World Bank Board" with more responsibilities including making major 
policy decisions, conducting general oversight of the institution, and 
approving the World Bank Group's overall strategy and direction. 98 
Furthermore, all responsibility for the approval of all World Bank 
Group financing operations should be transferred to Management. 99 
The separation of management responsibilities will provide a checks 
and balances system where management will be accountable through 
effective performance evaluation by the World Bank Board. 100 
III. THE IMPOSITION OF NEOLIBERALISM ON A GLOBAL 
SCALE 
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of the 
economic principles which have controlled the actions of the BWis and 
World Trade Organizations and how these principles have led to the 
failure of these institutions. Subsection A suggests that specific 
economic policies have played a fundamental role in the outcome of 
implementing the ideals underlying the BWis. 101 Subsection "B" 
presents the evolution of neoliberalism and how it has had dramatic 
negative effects on the global economy throughout the last two 
centuries. 102 Subsection "C" analyzes the IMF and the World Bank's 
use of loan conditions, their chosen tool for imposing neoliberalism. 103 
95. ZEDILLO COMM'N, REPOWERING THE WORLD BANK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 
REPORT OF THE HIGH- LEVEL COMMISSION ON MODERNIZATION OF WORLD BANK GROUP 
GOVERNANCE 30 (2009) [hereinafter ZEDILLO COMM'N REPORT], available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/WBGovemanceCOMMISSIONREPO 
RT.pdf. (last visited Oct. 11, 2013). 
96. Id.; Governing Structure of the World Bank, THE WORLD BANK, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/O,,contentMDK:20094705-
menuPK:220464-pagePK:220503-piPK:2204 76-theSitePK:228717 ,00.html (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2013). 
97. See ZEDILLO COMM'N REPORT, supra note 95, at 30, 39. 
98. Id. at 39. 
99. Id. at 40. 
100. See id. at 43. 
101. See infra Part III.A. 
102. See infra Part III.B. 
103. See infra Part III.C. 
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Subsection "D" presents case studies on Argentina and Africa and how 
the neoliberalist approach of the IMF and World Bank has impacted 
those countries. 104 
A. Influence through Vote and Governance 
The British economist Keynes was a key participant at the Bretton 
Woods. 105 Through the looking glass of the Great Depression, the IMF 
and the World Bank's policies were based primarily on Keynes' 
prescriptions to resolve global economic problems. 106 However, by the 
mid 1980's, the controlling economic policy of these institutions shifted 
to the neoclassical approach. 107 "The Keynesian orientation of the IMF, 
which emphasized market failures and the role for government in job 
creation, was replaced by the free market mantra of the 1980' s, as part 
of a new "Washington Consensus"- a consensus between the IMF, the 
World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury about the "right" policies for 
developing countries-that signaled a radically different approach to 
economic development and stabilization." 108 Rapid trade liberalization 
corresponding to the free market ideology would ultimately lead to the 
colonization of developing countries to the IMF. 109 
The IMF brought in the World Bank initially planning to provide 
billions of dollars in emergency support to Europe after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. 110 In the 1980's the Bank lost sight of this humanitarian 
foundation and began lending structural adjustment loans burdened with 
IMF imposed conditions to developing countries. 111 The BWis 
collectively represented the aggregate desire of the capitalist market to 
expand globally beyond the boundaries of the developed industrial 
world with minimum state restrictions. 112 Within the IMF, capitalistic 
104. See infra Part III.D. 
105. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 11. 
106. See id. 
107. See ARIEL BUIRA, THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK AT SIXTY, 8 (2005) ("The 
growing breach between world economic and financial realities and the governance 
structure of the BWis argues for reform to enhance the legitimacy and restore the 
effectiveness of these institutions"). 
108. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 16. 
109. Seeid. 
110. See id. at 14. 
111. See CARL JAY ARAJAH & WILLIAM H. BRANSON, OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEP'T, 
STRUCTURAL & SECTORAL ADJUSTMENT: WORLD BANK EXPERIENCE, 1980-92 (1995) 
(explaining an extensive study performed by the Operations Evaluation Department in 1995 
regarding the World Bank's experience with adjustment lending in the 1980' s, including 
conditionality). 
112. See BUIRA, supra note 3, at 8; Under Bretton Woods, structural balance of 
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nations like the United States and England forcibly imposed neoliberal 
ideologies on underdeveloped countries by swinging heavily weighted 
voting power in favor of free markets. 113 President Reagan brought this 
neoliberal ideal to the annual meeting of the World Bank in 1983 when 
he stated: 
The societies that achieved the most spectacular, broad based 
economic progress in the shortest period of time have not been the 
biggest in size, nor the richest in resources and certainly not the most 
rigidly controlled. What has united them all was their belief in the 
magic of the marketplace. Millions of individuals making their own 
decisions in the marketplace will always allocate resources better than 
1. . 114 any centra 1ze government p annmg process. 
The IMF was the perfect mechanism for the United States to 
realistically puursue an implementation of the free market concept on a 
global scale. 15 Starting in the mid 1970's, the IMF and the World Bank 
hired graduates from the Chicago School to implement capitalistic free 
market irrespective of humanitarian rights. 116 Underdeveloped 
countries which had sought refuge in the IMF and World Bank were 
blindly subjected to the neoliberal ideas of the Chicago School and 
became heavily indebted to the institutions. 117 
The IMF issued structural adjustment programs to bail out 
countries in financial crisis, which also helped to advance privatization 
payments disequilibria were to be corrected by exchange rate movements. Id. The IMF 
through its surveillance function is supposed to assess a country's economic health by 
reviewing its monetary, fiscal, exchange rate, trade and other financial policies. Id. 
However, under Milton Friedman's floating exchange rate approach, developed countries 
would essentially absolve themselves from any form of IMF oversight. See MILTON 
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, 65- 71 (2nd ed. 1982); John R. Kroger, Enron, 
Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor's Perspective, 76. U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 
60-65 (2005) (stating there is a complete lack of transparency and review of leading 
international financial bodies promotes lack of discretion, illegality, and fraud within the 
global economic community). 
113. See STIGLITZ, supra note I, at 14- 15. The IMF and the World Bank were both 
driven by the collective will of the G- 7, the governments of the most important advanced 
industrial countries. Id. These countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, Canada, 
Italy, and France. Id. In year 2011 the G-8 was formed to include Russia. Id. 
114. See RICHARD PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY: THE IMF, WORLD BANK, AND WTO 13 
(2003) (recognizing that Friedman and the Austrian School of Economics had profound 
implications on global fiscal policy). 
115. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER 
CAPITALISM 388-403 (2007). 
116. Id. at 161-63 ( describing the policy makers of the IMF and their relation to the 
Chicago School). 
117. See generally id. at 388-403 (building a connection between lifting regulations on 
interest rates and the colonization of Third World countries). 
25
Wolff: Failure of the International Monetary Fund
Published by SURFACE, 2013
96 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 41: 1 
and free trade. 118 Countries which adhered to the adjustment programs 
took on massive floating interest rate loans. 119 Since interest rates were 
not regulated under the IMF and World Bank, 120 eventually the cost of 
borrowing money increased at a faster pace than countries could repay 
debt. This morally bankrupt lending practice was the driving force 
behind the colonization of the financially bankrupt counties to the IMF 
and World Bank. 121 
B. Evolution and Critique of Neoliberalism 
Prior to an examination on the impact of neoliberalism on the 
policies of the IMF and World Bank, it is worth discussing the evolution 
of political economics. During a time when government regulations 
were desired Keynesian economics became the most popular. 122 From 
the Great Depression until the end of World War II, Keynesian 
economics had its primary influences on economic policies. 123 Keynes 
presumed that in order to correct market imperfections, state 
intervention had to be implemented. 124 One of the most important 
118. Id. at 155- 56, 200-03, 216. The IMF was originally concerned with exchange 
rates and balance of payment loans. Id. The IMF short term loans were at first used mainly 
by the same circle of industrial economies that had dominated the institution ' s founding. 
KLEIN, supra note 115, at 155-56, 200-03, 216 (2007). The IMF shifted in the mid 1970's 
to a more intervention- type stance where loans were granted under conditions of greater 
austerity to Third World countries. Loan conditionality was based on how countries achieve 
economic growth. This conception was formulated by right wing politicians and 
bureaucrats operating mainly through the U.S. Treasury in the series of Republican 
administrations. The result of neoliberal conditionality, together with policy moves, such as 
capital account liberalization, has proven to be disastrous for working people in developing 
countries. Id. 
119. See generally KLEIN, supra note 115 at 156 ( discussing the issues pertaining to 
government debt inheritance). 
120. See BUIRA, supra note 3, at 72 (stating that Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher 
had a policy to promote free market reform and opened the developing world to foreign 
trade and investment). 
121. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 41 (stating that the Fund's approach to developing 
countries has had the feel of a colonial ruler); See generally KLEIN, supra note 115 
(explaining that industrialized countries pillage Third World countries in the modem day 
just as governments colonized the New World in the pre- industrialization era). 
122. See PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ON ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS 
OF 2008 100 (2009) ( explaining how during the 1930s the United States fell into the Great 
Depression and John Maynard Keynes attempted to explain the causes of the slump to the 
general public). 
123. See id. at 102 (expounding on the notion that Keynes was in favor of 
macroeconomic intervention and this was viewed as acceptable by conservatives throughout 
WWII). 
124. See id. (making an assumption that Kenyes did not want to return to a free market 
ideal even after the economy responded positively to government intervention). 
26
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/4
2013] Failure to Achieve Integral Development 97 
lessons which Keynes helped teach was that markets are not self-
correcting and government intervention is required to ensure recovery 
and a return to full employment. 125 
Keynesian economics lost popularity in the mid 1970's due to 
stagflation and associated ideological assaults launched by the Chicago 
School. 126 Unlike Keynes' idealization of government regulations, 
economists from the Chicago School such as Milton Friedman 
perceived most government expenditures as excessive. Hence, 
government intervention was viewed as inefficient and not likely to 
achieve projected goals. 127 
With the help of Friedman, the Chicago School derived a three-part 
formula for creating the perfect free market economy. 128 The formula 
included government deregulation, privatization of government 
enterprises, and cutbacks on government spending. 129 Under this 
125. See JOSEPH E. STJGLITZ, THE STIGLITZ REPORT 20 (2010) (explaining how the 
United States economy would not have recovered after Great Depression without 
government intervention). 
126. See BEN FINE, ECONOMICS IMPERIALISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROGRESS, HISTORY 
OF ECONOMICS REVIEW 15 (2000). The cornerstone of Milton Friedman's economic theory 
was that individuals make economic choices based upon self interests alone, and therefore, 
rational expectations of individuals in the market cannot be predicted through quantitative 
data. See id. Optimal levels of economic health were measured and predicted by 
formulating the rational expectations of individuals. Id. Friedman's rational expectations 
theory did not simulate a systematic macroeconomic policy requiring the gathering of data 
to calculate economic agents. Id. 
127. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 60 (discussing the economic policies behind the 
global financial crisis of 2008 and mentioning how doctrines that supported deregulation 
were predicated on the assumption that sophisticated market participants were rational and 
had rational expectations and unfettered markets would result in optimal economic 
efficiency). 
128. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 65- 71 (2d ed. 1982). 
Friedman promoted a floating exchange rate system because it is self-correcting and fully 
automatic. Friedman believed the instability of exchange rates is a symptom of instability in 
the underlying economic structure. Elimination of this symptom by administrative freezing 
of exchange rates, a method of direct controls, only aggravates the underlying problem. One 
way to correct this problem is for the U.S. to announce that it will not proclaim official 
exchange rates between the dollar and other currencies, and in addition, it will not engage in 
any speculative or other activities influencing exchange rates. Id. Exchange rates would 
then be determined in free markets. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 65-71 
(2d ed. 1982). These measures would conflict with the U.S. obligation to the IMF, to 
specify an official parity for the dollar. However, the IMF found it possible to reconcile 
Canada's failure to specify a parity with its Articles and gave its approval to a floating rate 
for Canada. The IMF should do the same for the U.S. Also, other nations will be able to 
peg their currency to the U.S. by drawing on reserves, coordinating their internal policies 
with U.S. policy, and by tightening or loosening direct controls on trade. Id. 
129. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 65- 71 (2d ed. 1982). 
(speaking on the pitfalls of social welfare programs and government regulations; for 
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doctrine, only self regulation was appropriate. 130 To increase overall 
wealth, the government would have to not only sell all state capital 
assets to private corporations, but also required dramatic cut backs on 
entitlements, minimal taxes, and a deregulation of trade. 131 
In the late twentieth century, the Chicago School began to have a 
profound influence on South American Governments such as Chile. 132 
At this time, Chile was under the power of a socialist group led by 
Salvador Allende ("Allende"). 133 Allende came into power as a result 
of an election in which he promised to promote a democratic society. 134 
Conversantly, Allende proceeded to convert Chile into a fully fledged 
communist state. 135 In tum, Allende's communist policies provoked the 
military to overthrow him and set up a military regime led by General 
example, mm1mum wage laws effectively increase the unemployment rate because 
employers cannot afford to pay workers at the required rates). But see Frontline: The 
Warning (PBS DVD release Jan. 5, 2010) (showing that Summers, the Obama's 
administration financial advisor, is unopposed to government regulation). 
130. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 60 ( discussing the doctrines which support free 
markets). 
131. See generally Kroger, supra note 112, at 57, 60 (exemplifying the consequences 
of complete government deregulation; Enron was built upon deregulation). 
132. See e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, PROFIT OVER PEOPLE: NEOLIBERALISM & GLOBAL 
ORDER 9 (2003); see also BUIRA, supra note 3, at 145 (During the 1990's, policymakers in 
Chile sought to improve investor confidence and promote stable, sustainable economic and 
export growth. Chile confronted issues resulting from the neoliberal hyperinflation with 
Capital Management Techniques "CMTs". The CMT Chile set in place in the 1990's was 
designed to insulate the economy from volatile international capital flows). 
133. See e.g., id. Friedman had no qualms over the military overthrow of Chile's 
democratically elected Allende government in 1973, because Allende was interfering with 
business control of Chilean society. Id. After fifteen years of often brutal and savage 
dictatorship-all in the name of the democratic free market- formal democracy was 
restored in 1989 with a constitution that made it vastly more difficult, if not impossible, for 
the citizenry to challenge the business- military domination of Chilean society. Id; see also 
KLEIN, supra note 115, at 97(explaining how Segio de Castro was a prominent Chilean U.S. 
trained economist). See generally KLEIN, supra note 115, at 18, 82. ( defining the trinity of 
free markets as privatization, deregulation, and cuts of social spending). 
134. See BUIRA, supra note 3, at 145 (explaining how Chile uses CMT's to protect 
their economic infrastructures which were derailed during the 1970's and 1980's when the 
Chicago School had profound influences on their financial stability). "The policy regime 
sought to balance the challenges and opportunities of financial integration, lengthen the 
maturity structure and stabilize capital inflows, mitigate the effect of large volumes of 
inflow on the currency and exports, and protect the economy from the instability associated 
with speculative excess and the sudden withdrawal of external finance." Id. 
135. See id. at 146 (Ariel Buira and the G- 24 Research Program 2003) (explaining the 
Chilean model, whereby, financial integration in Chile was regulated through a number of 
complementary, dynamic measures; the authorities revalued the exchange rate mechanism 
that was initially adopted in the early 1980's). 
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Pinochet. 136 
Pinochet and his military tried to increase the overall wealth the 
Chilean economy. 137 However, inflation doubled in the first eight or 
nine months of their regime. 138 When rates of inflation continued to 
rise, Pinochet consulted with economists to stabilize the failed 
economy. 139 These economists were called "Chicago Boys" because 
they had studied at the University of Chicago and had received their 
Ph.D. degrees at the University of Chicago. 140 At the time, the 
"Chicago Boys" was the only group of economists in Chile not tainted 
by a connection with the Allende socialists. 141 They were untainted 
because the University of Chicago was one of the only institutions in 
the United States where the economics department had a strong group 
of free market economists. 142 
The Chicago Boys assured Pinochet that if he withdrew 
government involvement from all private sectors at once that the natural 
laws of economics would push the domestic economic variables, such 
as inflation and unemployment, back to equilibrium. 143 Pinochet 
followed the Chicago School's recommendations; he privatized a 
majority of state-owned companies including several banks, permitted 
speculative financing of projects, opened boarders to foreign imports 
exposing Chilean manufacturers to competition, and cut all government 
136. See id. ( explaining how regulations in Chile were central to the success of the 
Chilean model; foreign loans faced a tax of 1.2% per year; foreign direct investment and 
private investment faced a one year residence requirement). 
137. See id. at 147 (showing how CMT's greatly reduced the likelihood that the 
currency would appreciate and made it difficult for investors to leave, which would 
ultimately jeopardize the Chilean currency). 
138. See id. (showing that despite restraints on trade, investors committed funds to the 
Chilean infrastructure because the regime offered attractive opportunities for development 
within their growing market). 
139. See ButRA, supra note 3, at 151(Ariel Buira and the G24 Research Program 2003) 
( explaining how the CMTs employed in Chile in the 1990s not only reduced the risk of 
financial crisis but was a major preventative defense against IMF involvement within their 
policymaking). 
140. See KLEIN, supra note 115, at 71, 77- 81 (describing the Chicago Boys influence 
on the Chilean government in the 1970's and 1980's). 
141. See ButRA, supra note 3, at 150. "The general soundness of the Chilean banking 
system in the 1990s and macroeconomic policy, the maintenance of price stability and the 
high level of official reserves were important sources of investor confidence." Id. 
"International support for the neoliberal aspects of Chile's economic reforms provided the 
government with the political space to experiment with CMTs." Id. 
142. See KLEIN, supra note 115 at 75 (explaining how the Chicago School influenced 
the theory taught within the Chilean economic schools). 
143. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 15 (2d. ed. 1982) (explaining 
how neoliberalism is the cure to economic inefficiencies). 
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funding by ten percent. 144 In 1974, Pinochet's adaptations backfired 
and inflation escalated above 700 percent. 145 Both Castro and scholars 
of the Chicago School insisted that the inflation was attributable to 
Pinochet's incorrect implementation of free market ideals. 146 Noam 
Chomsky articled the concerns of Henry Kissinger regarding the 
likelihood of a widespread negative implication of Pinochet's regime. 147 
Chomsky described the implications of the Chilean economic practices 
as a true threat to social change worldwide. 148 
Within a year, Friedman convinced Pinochet to fire his economic 
advisor and hire Sergio de Castro as the finance minister. 149 Castro 
invited friends from the Chicago School to join him to work with him in 
the Chilean government and app ointed one of the Chicago School 
economists to the central bank. 15 In 197 5, over 500 companies were 
privatized, government spending was cut by twenty seven percent, 
domestic manufacturers were absolved, and the Chilean economy fell 
into a major recession. 151 Friedman's concept of shocking the economy 
into equilibrium by lifting all government restraints on trade had failed 
to cure Chile's domestic economic market problems. 152 
Certain governments, such as Mexico, have begun to view Chile as 
a model of a failed free market and realize the necessity to strengthen 
their financial systems through regulations. 153 However, supporters of 
144. See KLEIN, supra note 115, at 75- 100 (stating that Pinochet was an admired 
Chilean leader, and defining the trinity of free markets as privatization, deregulation, and 
cuts of social spending). 
145. Inflation Chile 1974, INFLATION.EU, available at http://www.inflation.eu/inflation-
rates/chile/historic-inflation/cpi-inflation-chile-1974.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
146. See id. at 75- 80 (explaining how the Chicago Boys influenced Chilean economic 
policy). 
147. See CHOMSKY, supra note 132, at 21 - 22. Noam Chomsky is the leading 
intellectual figure in the world today in the battle for democracy and against neoliberalism. 
Id. at 11. In the 1960 's, Chomsky was a prominent U.S. critic of the Vietnam war, and, 
more broadly, he became perhaps the most trenchant analyst of the ways U.S. foreign policy 
undermines democracy, quashes human rights, and promotes the interests of the wealthy 
few. Id. In the 1970 's, Chomsky, along with his co- author Edward S. Herman, began their 
research on how the U.S news media serves elite interests and undermines the capacity of 
the citizenry to actually rule their lives in a democratic fashion. Id. at 11. 
148. See id. (describing the issues of Chile in light of neoliberal influence). 
149. See KLEIN, supra note 115, at 75. 
150. See id. at 254-55 (explaining how the Chicago Boys sought to liberate central 
banks in Africa). 
151. See id. at 1 00 
152. See id. at 75- 100 (denoting how the Chicago Boy theory of economic policy did 
not have positive long lasting effects on the Chilean economy). 
153. See KRUGMAN, supra note 122, at 31 - 34. ("If a national economy goes sour and 
default looms, the IMF is the preferred creditor. It gets paid back first even if others, such 
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free markets, such as the Washington Consensus, continue to argue 
against any artificial barriers to trade. 154 The free market supporters 
continue to believe that growth can be achieved through sound budgets, 
low inflation, deregulation of markets, and free trade. 1 5 
Further magnifying the failure of Chile's economic policies was 
the success of countries that have moved away from the policies set 
forth by the "Washington Consensus." Brazil and Bolivia are two 
examples of two South American economies that have challenged the 
neoliberal model and moved to a more nationalistic approach. 156 
Bolivia, like many other South American countries, was in the 
midst of a debt crisis at the start of the 1980s. 157 Fueled by increased 
public borrowing during the petrodollar boom of the 1970's and the 
corruption of the military governments, Bolivia's GDP declined every 
year between 1981-1986. 15 Pushed to the brink of insolvency resulting 
from the falling price of tin elections were held a year early. 159 The 
election of Victor Paz Estenssoro marked the beginning of 
as foreign creditors, do not. They might get nothing. So a rational private sector financial 
institution is going to insist on a risk premium- a higher interest rate to cover the higher 
likelihood of not getting paid back."); See also STIGLITZ, supra note l, at 206. 
154. See KRUGMAN, supra note 122, at 31- 34. Stiglitz, commenting on his experience 
at the World Bank and their failed policy decision making: 
At the World Bank, during the time I was there, there was an increasing conviction 
that participation mattered, that policies and programs could to be imposed on 
countries but to be successful had to be "owned" by them, that consensus building 
was essential, that policies and development strategies had to be adapted to the 
situation in the country, that there should be a shift from "conditionality" to 
"selectivity", rewarding countries that had proved track records for using funds well 
with more funds, trusting them to continue to make good use of their funds, and 
providing them with strong incentives. 
Id.; see also STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 49. 
155. See KRUGMAN, supra note 122, at 31- 34. 
156. Nathaneal Hamilton, The Brazilian Economy in Transition: Explaining President 
Lula's Response to Neoliberal Reform (May 23, 2011) (unpublished M.A. dissertation, San 
Diego State University), available at http://sdsu-
dspace.calstate.edu/bitstream/handle/l 0211.10/1351 /Hamilton_ Nathanael.pdf?sequence= 1 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
157. Lydia Chavez, Man in the News; Bolivian in an Encore: Victor Paz Estenssoro, 
THE N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 1985), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 1 985/08/07 /world/man-in-the-news-bo l ivian-in-an-encore-victor-
paz-estenssoro .html (last visited Oct. 22, 2013). 
158. Benjamin Kohl, Challenges to Neoliberal Homogenies in Bolivia, ANTIPODE 304, 
3 10 (2006), available at 
http://www.temple.edu/gus/kohl/documents/ChallengesNLHegAntipode .. pdf (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2013). 
159. Id. 
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neoliberalism in Bolivia. 160 
Paz Estenssoro, through Presidential Decree 21060, initiated the 
New Economic Policy (NEP), which called for the closing of state 
mines, privatized state-owned enterprises, and increased foreign direct 
investment, all leading to the end of protectionist policies that had been 
in place. 161 While the plan initially succeeded in slowing inflation 
within the first couple of weeks, over time it failed to address Bolivia's 
fundamental economic problems. 162 In 1993, under the leadership of 
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, Bolivia instituted what is known as "El 
Plan de Todos."163 The Law of Capitalization implemented the partial 
privatization of five major industries in Bolivia: oil and gas, 
telecommunications, airlines, power generations, and railroads. 164 
Bolivia, a 50% shareholder in the multinational corporations that took 
control of these industries, planned on using the stock revenue to bail 
out the failing national pension system; however, factors such as lost 
revenues resulting from the Law of Capitalization as well as economic 
forecasts not being met led to a major reduction of government 
programs. 165 A populist backlash against neoliberal policies soon 
followed, culminating in the Cochabamba Protests of 2000 and the 
Bolivian gas conflict of 2003. 166 The current administration has 
attempted to further implement state control over the national economy, 
as evidenced by the nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector. 167 
The result seems to be a success for Bolivia. In 2010, the 
country's exports totaled $7.1 billion while imports totaled $5.3 billion, 
resulting in a healthy trade surplus of $1.6 billion. 168 Bolivia is part of 
several international trade partnerships, including the Andean 
Community (the "CAN") and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas 
(the "ALBA"). 169 The country currently enjoys a BB- rating from the 
rating agency, Standards and Poor. 170 Though the country still is 
160. Chavez, supra note 157. 
161. Kohl, supra note 158. 
162. Id. at 310-11. 
163. Benjamin Kohl, Restructuring Citizenship in Bolivia: El Plan de Todos, 27.2 
INT'L J. URB. & REG'L RES. 337, 340 (2003). 
164. Id. "El Plan de Todos" was not a complete transfer over of the public sector to 
private industry; rather, it was a sale of 50% of the state industries to multinational 
corporations. The remaining shares were transferred back to the . Id. 
165. Id. 




170. Sovereign's Ratings List, STANDARD AND POOR'S RATINGS SERVS., available at 
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heavily dependent on foreign assistance to help finance development 
projects, 171 Bolivia has rebounded nicely following the reign of 
neoliberalism in the country. 
Brazil presents another successful example of a country flourishing 
after moving away from neoliberal policies. Neoliberal reform was 
brought to Brazil after the election of Fernando Collor de Mello in 
1990. 172 The Collor de Mello administration implemented a number of 
policies to help deal with the high inflation rates of the 1990' s, 
including market deregulation, reduction of import tariffs, and an 
investor-friendly tax system that helped pave the way to opening up 
Brazil to the global market. 173 A second round of neoliberal policies 
were followed up by the administration of Itamar Franco with the 
"Plano Real". 174 These measures involved a mix of privatizing several 
state-owned entities, including a global public offering of shares of the 
oil and gas giant Petrobas, and the raising of interest rates. 175 The plan 
drew a huge influx of foreign investors to Brazil. 176 Although the 
"Plano Real" seemed to first be a success, it was not able to bring about 
mass prosperity. 177 
Former President Luiz Ignazio "Lula" Da Silva had to juggle 
between not upsetting his left-leaning Workers Party base and 
representing the interests of the conservative neoliberals. 178 Lula issued 
a statement during the 2002 campaign stating that his government 
would respect the IMF programme agreed upon by the Cardoso 
administration and has maintained interest rates at levels set out by the 
"Plano Real." 179 In stark contrast to these neoliberal measures, Lula 
introduced "Bolsa Familia", a government program aimed to help 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/ sovereigns/ratings-
list/en/us/?subSectorCode=39&sectorld= 1221186707758&subSectorld= 1221187348494 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2013). 
171. U.S. State Dep't, supra note 166. 
172. James Brooke, Man in the News; The Choice of Brazilians; Fernando Col/or, 
THE N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 1989), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/20/world/man-in-the-news-the-choice-of-brazilians-
femando-collor.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2013). 
173. Maria de Lourdes Rollemberg Mollo & Alfredo Saad- Filho, Neoliberal 
Economic Policies in Brazil (1994- 2005): Cardoso, Lula and the Need for a Democratic 
Alternative, 11 NEW POL. ECON. 99 (2006). 
174. Id. 
175. Hamilton, supra note 156. 
176. Id. 
177. Sovereign's Ratings List, supra note 170. 
178. Gerardo Renique, Introduction: Latin America Today: The Revolt Against 
Neoliberalism, 19 SOCIALISM AN o DEMOCRACY 1, 1- 11, 182 (2005). 
179. Hamilton, supra note 156. 
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reduce poverty by providing a government subsidy to families whose 
children attend school. 180 The multidisciplinary approach used by 
Brazil may be the reason for its economic success. 
Amid an economic downturn throughout the global markets, Brazil 
has managed to maintain strong economic activity. 181 The state-run 
energy company, Petrobras, is among the international industrial leaders 
in oil production. 182 A portion of government expenditures has been 
directed at a number of high-tech industries, including aerospace, 
information technology, and telecommunication. 183 Government's 
willingness to invest in innovation has led to success in private 
entrepreneurship, resulting in a growing middle class that now accounts 
for more than half of the 190 million people in Brazil. 184 With a 
nominal GDP of $2.09 trillion, the country enjoyed a GDP growth of 
7.5% in 2010. 185 The country currently enjoys an A- rating from the 
rating agency, Standards and Poor. 186 Brazil is an emerging market rich 
with resources that is looking to benefit from added representation at the 
negotiating tables of the BWis. 187 
C. Loan Conditionality 
The economic policies of those in charge of running the IMF and 
World Bank have generally been imposed through conditions placed on 
loans and other benefits of membership with the IMF and World Bank. 
The IMF' s embracement of loan conditionality was declared the 
"biggest divergence from the Bretton Woods objectives."188 The 
180. How to get children out of jobs and into school:The limits of Brazil's much 
admired and emulated anti- poverty programme, ECONOMIST (Jul. 29, 2010) available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/16690887 (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
181. See Andrew Downie & Tim Padgett, The One Country That Might Avoid 
Recession . . . , TIME (Mar. 05, 2009), available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1883301-1,00.html (last visited Oct. 25, 
2013). 
182. See Lori Ioannou, Brazil's Start-up Generation, Time Online, Aug. 22, 2010, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,201007 6,00.html (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
183. Press Release, U.S. State Dep't, Background notes: Brazil (Mar, 8, 2011). 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Sovereign's Ratings List, supra note 170. 
187. See Julia E. Sweig, A New Global Player: Brazil's Far-Flung Agenda, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS (Nov/Dec 2010), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66868/julia-e-
sweig/a-new-global-player (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
188. Yilmaz Akyuz, The Rationale For Multilateral Lending; A Critical Assessment 
20 (July 5, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.new-
rules.org/storage/documents/ffd/akyuz04.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
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principle of conditionality was incorporated within the Articles of 
Agreement in 1969, empowering the IMF to condition access to 
financial assistance upon the borrowing country's assent to mandated 
reforms targeting primary causes of their balance of payments issues. 189 
The majority of conditions imposed on poor countries wanting loans 
from the IMF and World Bank include privatization-related 
conditions. 19° For example, when Bangledesh received a large credit 
from the World Bank in 2005, of the fifty-three conditions added to the 
loan, eighteen required that Bangladesh, where over 50% of the 
population lives below the poverty line, privatize its banks, electricity, 
and telecommunications sectors. 1 1 Despite the fact these conditions 
have ultimately made matters worse within poorer countries, the 
average amount of conditions imposed on low income countries rose 
from forty-eight per loan to sixty-seven per loan between 2002 and 
2005. 192 
The World Bank has also been known to impose conditions 
involving trade liberalization on poor countries. 19 Rwanda was 
189. Article V, Section 3(a) of the Articles of Agreement provides: 
The Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its general resources, including policies 
on stand- by or similar arrangements, and may adopt special policies for special 
balance of payments problems, that will assist members to solve their balance of 
payments problems in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Agreement 
and that will establish adequate safeguards for the temporary use of the general 
resources of the Fund. 
IMF ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, Amended July 28, 1969, available at 
http: //www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). The nature of 
the conditions have predominantly centered on restricting government spending and foreign 
borrowing, regulating currency to limit inflation, and in strengthening banking supervision. 
See id.; John W. Head, Law and Policy in International Finance Institutions: The Changing 
Role of Law in the IMF and the Multilateral Development Banks, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
PoL'Y 194, 214- 18 (2007- 2008) (discussing the legal aspects oflMF conditionality). 
190. EURODAD, WORLD BANK AND IMF CONDITIONALITY: A DEVELOPMENT INJUSTICE 
12 (2006), available at 
http://www.eurodad.org/uploadedfiles/whats_new/reports/eurodad_world_bank_and_imf_c 
onditionality_report.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2013); see also Privatization and the World 
Bank, THE WHIRLED BANK GROUP, available at 
http://www.whirledbank.org/development/private.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2013) 
( questioning the effectiveness of privatization conditions imposed by the IMF and World 
Bank, and providing examples of privatization conditions in Argentina, India, and Mexico). 
191. EURODAD, supra note 190, at 12; Shahzad Uddin & Trevor Hopper, Accounting 
for Privatisation in Bangladesh: Testing World Bank Claims, available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/21894315/ Accounting-for-Privatisation-in-Bangladesh-Testing-
World-Bank-Claims (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). 
192. EURODAD,supra note 190, at 9. 
193. Id. at 12; JUBILEE U.S.A., Are IMF and World Bank Economic Policy Conditions 
Undermining the Impact of Debt Cancellation? (2008), available at 
35
Wolff: Failure of the International Monetary Fund
Published by SURFACE, 2013
106 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 41:1 
conditioned to join the East African Trade Agreement, practically 
stripping its right to freely contract for its exports. 194 Bangladesh was 
required to remove any quantitative restrictions it had imposed on sugar 
imports. 195 Luckily, such trade conditions only constitute 3% of all 
World Bank conditions to low income countries. 196 
In essence, the purpose of the World Bank and IMF in giving loans 
to poorer countries is to assist those countries in raising their economy 
while helping to end the perpetuating cycle of poverty. However, the 
World Bank has been known to impose "Micro-Management" type 
conditions, which ultimately prevents much needed aid from reaching 
those actually in need of help. 197 Uganda, where 3 7. 7% of the country 
lives in poverty, was required to "review and approve its school sports 
policy for tertiary schools," before it could access its World Bank 
financing in 2005. 198 As a condition to receiving their financing, The 
Republic of Mali, where 10% of children die as infants, was forced to 
move its government offices to a new location. 199 
The discord between loan conditionality and development 
objectives is rooted in the IMF and World Bank's governance structure 
permitting dominant shareholders to utilize conditionality as a means of 
furthering their own global economic and political agendas. 200 Actions 
by the IMF and World Bank give credence to the growing belief that the 
http://www.jubileeusa.org/fileadmin/user _upload/Resources/Policy_ Archive/208briefnoteco 
nditionality.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2013)("Some of the most egregious policies force 
countries applying for debt relief to adhere to strict IMF fiscal and monetary targets, 
privatize key industries, liberalize their markets, and remove subsidies for sensitive 
commodities like gasoline and cooking oil. ''). 
194. EURODAD, supra note 190, at 15. 
195. Id.; Bangladesh: Trade Policy and Integration, THE WORLD BANK, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/EXTSA 
RREGTOPINTECOTRA/O,,contentMDK:20592516-menuPK:579454-pagePK:34004173-
piPK:34003707-theSitePK:579448,00.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). 
196. EURODAD, supra note 190, at .15. 
197. Id. at 11; KENYA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OFFICIAL REPORT 871 (May 3, 2006)("The 
impression that has been created is that . . . econ om[ ies] [are] being managed by the IMF 
and the World Bank. The impression is that all these prices are as a result of micro-
management by the IMF and the World Bank."). 
198. EURODAD, supra note 190, at 11. 
199. Id. 
200. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 19 (showing how sometimes conditionality was 
even counterproductive, either because the policies were not well suited to the country or 
because the way they were imposed engendered hostility to the reform process); Contra 
STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 52 (stating that "sometimes money has gone to governments with 
good policies in place- but not necessarily because the IMF recommended these policies."). 
Stiglitz also continues the argument that loan conditionalities shifted the debate inside the 
country in ways that led to better policies. Id. 
36
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/4
2013] Failure to Achieve Integral Development 107 
institutions "systematically act in the interest of creditors and of rich 
elites. . . in preference to that of workers, peasants, and other poor 
people."201 
D. Case Studies 
1. Argentina 
Argentina provides a context for exammmg the economic and 
human impact of IMF lending over the course of nearly half a century. 
Prior to World War I, Argentina was viewed by the public and investors 
as a land of opportunity. 202 Argentina was a resource-rich nation and 
therefore attracted both European and American investors. 203 The Great 
Depression negatively affected Argentina due to its reliance on 
exporting capital. 
Argentina initially appealed to the IMF for assistance in 1958 with 
the hope of receiving an infusion of capital to address its rampant 
inflation and a resulting balance of payment crisis. 204 The early 
successes associated with the loans were mitigated by an emerging 
discontent within the labor force stemming from a decrease in real 
wages, a rise in inflation, and a decline in the country's gross domestic 
product. 205 
Argentina's internal political problems led to a problematic 
relation.ship with the IMF until, in 1965, President Arturo Illia 
terminated Argentina's relationship with the IMF, rejecting all of the 
201. GILBERT RIST, THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT: FROM WESTERN ORIGINS TO 
GLOBAL FAITH 140-41 (2d ed. 2006) ( explaining that people in industrial countries began to 
complain that Third World demands were being ignored, causing the underdevelopment of 
the Global South). While transnational corporations were getting rich, countries of the 
South were being exploited for their resources. Id. 
202. See KRUGMAN,supra note 122, at 38-40. 
203. See id. 
204. See id. at 51 Argentina's lower profile rescue came via the World Bank, which 
enabled a capital injection of $12 billion to support the nation's banks. Id. Subsequently, 
the Fund conditionally provided capital in the amount of 75 million and a further 254 
million dollars, which was derived from public and private U.S. agencies. Id. 
205. Margaret Conklin & Daphne Davidson, The I.MF. and Economic and Social 
Human Rights: A Case Study of Argentina, 1958-1985, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 231 - 32 (1986) 
( explaining that in 1959 real wages, decreased by twenty- six percent from the previous 
year, inflation rose to 111 %, and GDP declined by eight percent). As the working class 
became increasingly dissatisfied, Argentina had a record number of employee strikes. Id. 
Even after the Fund negotiated similar stand- by arrangements for 1959 and 1960, the 
atmosphere within Argentina was not positive because the allocation of the funds were 
conditioned upon the attainment of strict deficit reduction goals that were reliant upon 
"large dismissals of employees, limitation on wage increases, and a reduction in public 
works." Id. 
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IMF's conditions and attempting to deal unilaterally with the $2.5 
billion Argentina owed to international creditors. 206 By failing to 
comply with the IMF's policies, Illia eroded international confidence in 
the Argentinean economy. This was reflected in the severe decline of 
international loans to the country over the next three year period, and 
thus, Illia suffered the same fate as his Argentinean predecessors. 207 
In 1967, Colonel Juan Ongania ascended to power and agreed to 
implement an IMF stabilization program, which mandated the same 
fiscal deficit and inflation goals that had relegated Argentina to a 
constant state of political and economic turmoil since 1958. 208 
However, in 1969 the IMF proclaimed a successful stabilization effort 
in Argentina based on an increase in its gross domestic product and 
reduction in the inflation rate. 209 These economic indicators seemingly 
validated the IMF's policies, but failed to resonate in the hearts of the 
Argentinean people who had been forced to adapt and survive on real 
wages that had fallen 11 % in 1968.210 
Starting in 1970, and continuing throughout the next three decades, 
the citizens of Argentina galvanized together against the IMF and 
fought for political changes as the IMF remained resolute in the 
conviction that the "shock therapy" approach was the right path for 
Argentina to attain progress and prosperity.211 After a further decline in 
real wages in 1978, only ten percent of the population had the economic 
means to purchase the government's shopping basket of basic goods 
206. Argentina: Going It Alone, TIME (Apr. 30, 1965), available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,898668,00.html (last visited Oct. 23 , 
2013) (explaining how Illia had attacked the IMF during his campaign for president, calling 
it an economic intruder and recommending that Argentina break relations with the Fund). 
207. Conklin & Davidson, supra note 205, at 234. International loans to Argentina fell 
drastically, from 361 million in 1962, to 99 million in 1963 and 6 million in 1964. See id. 
The military overthrew Illia in June 1966. Id. 
208. Id. at 235. Conditions in 1967 and 1968 including the devaluation of the peso, 
limits on fiscal deficit (increased utility charges for public services, restraints on 
government spending, and higher internal taxes), and wage controls (wage freezes until 
1968). Id. 
209. See KRUGMAN, supra note 122, at 41(comparing Mexico and Argentina's positive 
reaction to capital inflows when inflation dropped to nearly zero and GDP increased by 25% 
in three years). 
210. Conklin & Daphne Davidson, supra note 205, at 236. 
211. See Kim Reisman, World Bank and the IMF: At the Forefront of World 
Transformation, 60 FORDHAM L. Rev. 349, 390 (1991 - 1992) (explaining that shock therapy 
is a means used by the IMF and World Bank to establish a market economy in countries by 
inflicting the attendant hardships for as short a time as possible in contrast to an 
evolutionary or gradual approach). 
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and services.212 After struggling with massive inflation rates and a 
costly war that ended in 1982, Argentina appealed to the IMF for aid. 213 
The startling figures taken in the 1980's illuminate a blatant disregard 
by the IMF to balance the human cost of economic stabilization with the 
benefits of attaining arbitrary economic indicator targets. 214 The 
problems of inflation and economic stagnation in the 1980s culminated 
in the hyperinflation that occurred in 1989.215 
In 1991, Argentina instituted a Convertibility Plan designed to 
stabilize the economy through drastic measures, including fixing the 
peso to the U.S. dollar.216 The Convertibility Plan and structural 
reforms led to stabilization, and the IMF believed that the six percent 
average GDP growth through 1997 was a sign of the success of these 
measures.217 However, the appreciation of the currency placed exports 
and domestic producers at a disadvantage because payments became 
more difficult to make. Ultimately, the rise in prices led to a balance of 
payment issue. In 1995, the payment issue was coupled with 
government public relations problems with the IMF, and eventually 
resulted in the decline of the stock market. 218 Additionally, laws 
212. Conklin & Davidson, supra note 205, at 245- 52 (explaining that in the years of 
1976 to 1978, public sector employees had their wages decreased by 53%, so that the 
government could comply with the Fund's fiscal deficit targets). The Fund's demand to 
reduce government expenditures translated to massive cuts and layoffs of public sector 
employees who were already "paid among the lowest in Argentina." Id. Although the 
deficit declined, the citizens were confronted with the reality that the cost of gas, telephone, 
water, rail fares, electricity, postal charges, and metro fare had increased an average of 405 
percent. Id. 
213. Id. at 239; I.MF. Loan to Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1983, at D2 (explaining 
that in early 1983, the IMF approved a $2 billion loan, including $1.5 billion S DR, to 
improve the collapsing economy). 
214. Conklin & Davidson, supra note 205, at 245- 52 (explaining that a study in 1985 
estimated that one third of employed workers failed to earn sufficient wages so as to be able 
to feed a family of four); see Milt Freudenheim, Henry Giniger, & Richard Levine, A 
Heartfelt Cry From Alfonsin On Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1985, at 42 (explaining 
the plight of President Raul Alfonsin in 1985). Alfonsin 's presidency followed eight years 
of military rule. Id. During his presidency, inflation began eating away at the standard of 
living to a point where Alfonsin had to balance the IMF's demands for austerity measures 
with the demands by Argentinean wage-earners for pay increases. Id. 
215. INT'L MONETARY FUND INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, THE ROLE OF THE IMF IN 
ARGENTINA, 1991-2002 (July 2003), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2003/arg/070403 .pdf [hereinafter The Role of the IMF]. 
216. Id. ( defining the Convertibility Plan). It was centered around a currency board-
like arrangement in which the peso was fixed at par with the dollar and autonomous money 
creation by the central bank was severely constrained. Id. "[I]t also included a broader 
agenda of market-oriented structural reforms to promote efficiency and productivity." Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Juan Carlos Linares, After the Argentine Crisis: Can the IMF Prevent Corruption 
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influenced by the IMF conditions, along with changes to the social 
security system, ultimately sparked massive "anti-IMF riots" in 1998.219 
Later, in mid-2001, the lack of access to capital markets caused an 
increased capital flight that, in tum, resulted in Argentina's financial 
collapse later that year.220 Once again, as had happened repeatedly 
before 1991, Argentina was unable to meet IMF conditions and the IMF 
suspended disbursements. 221 The Convertibility Plan was widely 
criticized for failing to account for Argentina's internal conditions 
because linking the currency with the U.S. dollar forced Argentina to 
"align its monetary policy with that of the United States, despite 
cyclical differences between the two countries. "222 
The IMF' s negative involvement in Argentina culminated in 
January 2002, when the government of Argentina defaulted on $141 
billion in public sector debt; this embodied "the largest sovereign 
default" of a state in history. 223 The catalyst behind Argentina's default 
and economic collapse has been "attributed to the country's excessive 
adherence to International Monetary Fund advice. "224 Argentina's 2009 
statement that it does not need the IMF' s financial help seems tenuous 
at best, as earlier that same year Argentina demanded IMF loans 
without conditions. 225 It has been stated that "the success story of the 
in its Lending? A Model Approach, 5 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 13, 19 (2005) (explaining 
how Argentina was forced to renegotiate its IMF loan, leading to the stock market decline). 
219. Id. at 20 ( describing the situation in Argentina around the time prior to the anti-
IMF riots). The IMF's bailouts were seen as protecting the affluent at the expense of the 
poor. Id. The austerity programs installed to pay for the IMF loans were said to be 
absorbed by the poor instead of the wealthy. Id. 
220. The Role of the IMF, supra note 215. 
221. Id. ( explaining how this led to the abandonment of the Convertibility Plan and, by 
the end of 2002, the economy had contracted by twenty percent since 1998). 
222. The Role of the IMF, supra note 215; see Linares, supra note 218, at 23 
( explaining other factors that contributed to the economic collapse, including decline in 
capital flows, institutional and political factors unique to Argentina, external shocks, failures 
in the banking system, and systemic corruption that was inherent in Argentina's politics and 
economy). 
223. Linares, surpa note 218, at 18- 19 ( explaining the steps taken by the IMF and 
Argentina, starting in 1991 to its default in December 2001). Argentina's relationship with 
the IMF from l 990's through 2000 was marked by a series of renegotiations to loan 
agreements and requests for financial assistance. Id. Although Argentina never really 
complied with any of the IMF conditions, the IMF was unwilling to abandon its work there. 
Id. Meanwhile, Argentinean citizens and businesses found themselves marred in 
government tax increases and spending reductions. Id. 
224. See Jo Marie Griesgraber & Oscar Ugarteche, The IMF Today and Tomorrow: 
Some Civil Society Perspectives, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 351 (2006). 
225. Walter Brandimarte, Argentina Demands IMF Lend Without Conditions, 
REUTERS, Apr. 24, 2009, available at 
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Argentine stabilization program can be best told by international 
creditors as ... they have been paid punctually and ... could hardly be 
happier regarding the success of International Monetary Fund 
recommendations. "226 
2. Sub-Saharan Africa 
The BWis have been the cause of the most numerous set of 
policies Sub-Saharan African countries have ever faced. 227 Either 
directly, or as a consequence, the World Bank and IMF are responsible 
for policies which make significant changes in African economies. 228 
Even with the implementation of these policies, Sub-Saharan Africa is 
still the poorest region of the world and the least likely to meet the 
Millennium Development Goals229 by the established date. 230 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN24454 l 5920090424; Sujata Rao & Carolyn Cohn, 
Argentina Says Does Not Need Aid From IMF, REUTERS (Sept. 5, 2009, 2:30 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58429020090905. 
226. Conklin & Davidson, supra note 205, at 259- 60 (explaining how the Fund 
consistently went against the poor and working class Argentineans). The Argentine 
government, faced with many hardships, had poor bargaining power against the Fund. Id. 
227. AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 55 (2006) 
(listing the IMF and World Bank conditionality's in Sub-Saharan Africa as of 1999 as: 
Cameroon 92; Djibouti 134; Gambia 121; Ghana 80; Guinea 125; Madagascar 137; Mali 
105; Mozambique 74; Rwanda 135; Senegal 165; Tanzania 150; Uganda 74; and Zambia 
87). 
228. REGIONAL SURVEYS OF THE WORLD: AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 2004 20 
(Katherine Murison ed., 33d ed. 2003) (explaining how the IMF and World Bank have 
pushed pressured Sub- Saharan African countries to large scale economic reforms). In 1998, 
thirty- five African countries began economic reform programs or borrowed from the IMF to 
support economic reform programs. Id. A 1981 World Bank study proposed four economic 
policy changes including: (1) the correction of overruled exchange rates; (2) the 
improvement of price incentives for exports and agriculture; (3) the protection of industry in 
a more uniform and less direct way; and (4) the reduction of direct governmental controls. 
Id.; see GERARD ROLAND, PRIVATIZATION: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES 44 (2008) (explaining 
that most of these policies concentrated on the goals of privatizing and stabilizing the 
economies). The hope was for economic growth and financial development results to 
follow. Id. Many of the newly private companies, instead of contributing to the growth of 
the economy, actually worsened the population's situation by laying workers off. Id. In 
Zambia for example, two large mines were sold to a bidder who agreed not to dismiss any of 
the workers. Id. However, after title was transferred, three thousand of the seven thousand 
workers were dismissed, and subsequently, the new owner went out of business causing the 
remaining four thousand workers to lose their jobs. Id. 
229. The Millenium Development Goals: Eight Goals/or 215, UNITED NATIONS DEV. 
PROGRAMME, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (laying out the 
Millenium Development Goals, which include: ending poverty and hunger; universal 
education; gender equality; child health; maternal health; combating HIV, AIDS and other 
diseases; environmental sustainability; and global partnership). 
230. SAUL BERNARD COHEN, GEOPOLITICS: THE GEOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL 
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During the 1950s and 1960s, the World Bank concentrated on the 
development of physical infrastructure. 231 Through the 1970s, the 
Bank's lending shifted and concentrated more on social areas like 
education, water access, poverty reduction, and income distribution. 232 
However, as the 1980s approached, most economic leaders were 
conservative and favored economic liberalization and keeping 
governments at the edge of the economic markets. 233 In 1963, the IMF 
started lending to Sub-Saharan Africa; however, the number of loans 
granted to the area was relatively small until the 1970s.234 The World 
Bank, influenced by conservative economists, began taking this 
approach as well in the policies it pushed Sub-Saharan African 
countries to employ. 235 Lending during the 1980s became conditioned 
on economic policy reforms, and by the end of the decade, there was 
practically no difference between the World Bank and IMF 
conditionality terms. 236 Countries who received aid in Sub-Saharan 
Africa were at times undeserving, due to the political and economic 
turmoil present within. 237 
RELATIONS 31 (2009) ( explaining that the average per capita income in Sub- Saharan Africa 
is $2,500, and 30% of the working poor earn less than one dollar per day); see JEFFREY 
SACHS, COMMON WEALTH: ECONOMICS FOR A CROWDED PLANET 31 (2008) for a discussion 
on the history of Sub- Saharan Africa's poverty and lack of development in comparison with 
the United States and United Kingdom; see also ROB BOWDEN' AFRICA SOUTH OF THE 
SAHARA 10 (2008) (stating that the World Bank has said that twenty- two of the twenty- five 
poorest countries in the world are in Sub- Saharan Africa, Burundi being the poorest of the 
world, with an average annual income per person of $640). 
231. PHILIP W. JONES, EDUCATION, POVERTY AND THE WORLD BANK 11 (2006). 
232. John Williamson, The Impact of the Bretton Woods Institutions on the Prospects 
for development, in SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD ECONOMY IN THE 1990's 178, 179 
(Pauline H. Baker et al eds., 1993). From his first speech to the Board of Governors 
McNamara spoke of directing Bank lending toward improving the living conditions of 
individual poor people, and proposed expanding education lending to emphasize advanced 
technical training as well as fundamental literacy. Id.; see MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL 
INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 107 (1996); RONALD G. RIDKER, THE WORLD BANK'S 
ROLE IN HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN SUB- SAHARAN AFRICA: EDUCATION, 
TRAINING, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 42 (1994) (explaining that these were the goals of 
the World Bank's president at the time, Robert McNamara). 
233. See Williamson, supra note 232. 
234. Robert S. Browne, The IMF in Africa: A Case of Inappropriate Technology, in 
THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: ETHICS AND FOREIGN 
POLICY; VOLUME 3 (Robert J. Myers ed., 1987). 
235. See Williamson, supra note 232. 
236. IDA'S PARTNERSHIP FOR POVERTY REDUCTION: AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF 
FISCAL YEARS 1994- 2000 77 (2002); Howard Stein, Structural Adjustment, in THE ELGAR 
COMPANION TO DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 599 (David A. Clark ed. , 2006). 
237. KENDALL W. STILES, NEGOTIATING DEBT: THE IMF LENDING PROCESS 69, 75 
(1991) (describing the IMF's loan to Zaire). Zaire's Chief of State, Mobuto Sese Seko, 
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Both the World Bank and the IMF still subject African countries to 
dozens of conditions in order to receive loans. 238 The conditions are 
mainly focused on lowering government expenses on social issues and 
diverting them towards market liberalization in order to cover forgone 
government revenues from lowering export barriers. 239 The results of 
these conditions are lower salaries, impoverishment for Africans, and 
cheaper raw materials for multinational companies. 240 Presently the 
began talks with the IMF in 1976, and a forty- seven million dollar one- year stand- by loan 
was approved. Id. The loan called for a forty- two percent devaluation to align Zaire with 
the SOR; a twenty percent ceiling on wage increases; a cut of government expenditures 
involving foreign exchange; a twenty- two percent limit on domestic credit expansion during 
1976; and a renegotiation of external public debt. Id. Zaire became ineligible for further 
assistance in 1977 because it failed to meet conditions of the loan and repay debts. Id. at 72, 
76. Zaire provided the IMF with disjointed, uncoordinated, and confused financial 
information that "tried the patience of the IMF to its limit." Id. It also became clear to 
Zaire's creditors that Zaire had not intent to implement the IMF reforms. Id. In 1978, at the 
urging of Zaire' s creditors, the IMF sent officials to replace local Zairian financial 
leadership, and other stand- by arrangement of $155 million was given in 1979. Id. at 69, 
76. Zaire's political aristocracy frustrated the efforts of the IMF team, and thus the loans 
were cancelled by 1983. Id. at 70, 74. The willingness of the IMF to keep returning to 
Zaire with loans was deemed "startling" in the context that Zaire's performance indicated its 
unwillingness to meet the terms of its loans. Id. at 79, 83. 
238. See SALIWE M. KAWEWE, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF AFRICA, VOL. 5 43 
(Olufemi Wusu ed., 2007) (stating that if governments fail to meet the measures imposed, 
any loans that may have been promised to them are withheld or canceled); THE POLITICS AND 
POLICIES OF Sus- SAHARAN AFRICA 73 (Robert A. Dibie ed., 2001) (stating that "the 
conditions attached to World Bank and IMF structural adjustment program ... effectively 
transferred sovereignty from the African State to Washington") [hereinafter THE POLITICS 
AND POLICIES]. 
239. THE POLITICS AND POLICIES, supra note 238; see KAWEWE, supra note 238, at 44 
(stating that the World Bank and IMF force governments to reduce spending on basic 
human needs and necessities like the elimination of subsidies for food prices, and reduction 
or social welfare and programs, including health and education); VINCENT B. KHAPOY A, THE 
AFRICAN EXPERIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 182 (1998) (explaining how the IMF has required 
governments from Sub- Saharan Africa to reduce budget deficits by making cuts on 
expenditures on public programs). 
240. See KAWEWE, supra note 238, at 44 (noting Zimbabwe as an example where the 
elimination of price controls on manufactured goods, retrenchment of works, devaluation of 
currency, and privatization of government industries resulted in a sharp shrinkage of income 
opportunities for the urban middle class and the working class). The elimination of price 
controls simultaneously marginalizing the poor further, especially women and children. Id.; 
RICHARD PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY: THE IMF WORLD BANK AND WTO 141 (2007) (stating that 
during the 1980's when most African countries came under World Bank and IMF tutelage, 
per-capita income decreased by twenty five percent in most of Sub- Saharan Africa). In 
addition, the removal of food and agricultural subsidies caused prices to rise and created 
increased food scarcity. Id. Since between one- fourth and one- third of the population of 
Sub-Saharan Africa is malnourished, the vulnerability of African populations to the spread 
of diseases and other health problems, has increased. Id. This, coupled with the closing of 
numerous hospitals and the understaffing of the ones remaining, has only added to the 
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global economic crisis affecting the industrialized nations is likely to 
affect donors' commitments, and thus, efforts to reach the MDGs by the 
2015 deadline will be slowed down. 241 Sub-Saharan African countries 
have accumulated increasingly high debt allowances, whereby, interest 
outlay payments to financial institutions exceed income from loans 
which results in harmful net outflows of cash. 242 
The IMF and World Bank structural reforms have proven to be 
inefficient and detrimental to the people in Sub-Saharan Africa.243 
After adhering to the IMF's and World Bank's policies and mandated 
structural adjustments, residents of Sub-Saharan African countries have 
not experienced any long-term improvement in their living 
conditions.244 However, since the voting power in the IMF of all Sub-
Saharan African countries together is only about a fourth of that 
allocated to the United States alone, their voice is not likely to bring 
about any major reform. 245 
problems rampant within Sub-Saharan Africa. Id. 
241. UNITED NATIONS, WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATIONS AND PROSPECTS 2009 21 (2009) 
( explaining how the decrease in demand for exports, lower commodity prices, and decline in 
investments in the Sub- Saharan African region resulting from the crisis, will affect Sub-
Saharan African countries' economic development). 
242. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN HISTORY: VOLUME 1 338 (Kevin Shillington ed., 
2004). 
243. See REGIONAL SURVEYS OF THE WORLD: AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 2004 119 
(Katherine Murison ed., 33d ed. 2003) (explaining the case of Burkina Faso which 
highlights the inefficiencies of the policies) [hereinafter REGIONAL SURVEYS OF THE 
WORLD]. Since the 1970's there has been a history of fiscal deficit in Burkina Faso which 
has been mainly attributable to the economy's low taxable capacity. Id. In 1993 the IMF 
accorded an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility to Burkina Faso. Id. Under the terms 
of the accord the primary objective was to reduce the fiscal deficit, which was at 4.6% of 
GDP. Id. However, by 1994, instead of decreasing, the deficit had actually increased to 
5.1% of GDP. Id. By 1999, the deficit was still four percent of GDP. See REGIONAL 
SURVEYS OF THE WORLD, supra. 
244. Andrew Conteh, Sub-Saharan Africa in the Post Cold War Era, in THE POLITICS 
AND POLICIES OF Sus- SAHARAN AFRICA 73- 76 (Robert A. Dibie ed., 2001). 
245. International Monetary Fund, Annual Report 2009 47, available at 
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/ar/2009/eng/index.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) 
(showing that the aggregated voting power for all Sub- Saharan countries is 4.36 percent, 
while the Unites States alone holds 16.77 percent); see Maurilo Portugal, Improving IMF 
Governance and Increasing the Influence of Developing Countries, in IMF DECISION-
MAKING, IN REFORMING THE GOVERNANCE OF THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK 75, 83 (Ariel 
Buira ed., 2006) (explainifor Sub- Saharan Africa's voting power); see also MARCUS 
POWER, RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT AND GEOGRAPHIES 84 (2003) (explaining that similarly, 
in the World Bank, the G8 states hold ten times the voting power of all Sub- Saharan 
countries together). The G8 states hold forty percent of the voting power in the World 
Bank, while Sub-Saharan Africa holds just over four percent. Id. 
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3. The Asian Crisis 
The Asian financial crisis destroyed "the conventional wisdom that 
East Asia's economies would prosper indefinitely."246 While few 
scholars predicted it,247 the crisis showed the flaws of IMF loan 
conditionality and consequences of global financial liberalization. 248 
The "[f]inancial liberalization from the 1980's had major ramifications 
in the region as savings supplemented the already high domestic savings 
rates in the region to further accelerate the rate of capital 
accumulation. "249 
Although there are at least four competing explanations that 
provide background for how the Asian financial crisis began, 250 it 
officially started in July 1997 in Thailand, after the Thai government 
began to float its currency, the Thai baht.251 At that time, "the growth 
246. Peter A. Coclanis & Tilak Doshi, Globalization in Southeast Asia, 570 ANNALS, 
July 2000, at 49, 56-57 (explaining that few would have predicted the crisis because leading 
up to 1995 because per capita growth in Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand was 
much greater in comparison to that of South Asia and Latin America); JEFFREY D. SACHS & 
WING THYE Woo, UNDERSTANDING THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE ASIAN FINANCIAL 
CRISIS: LESSONS FOR A RESILIENT ASIA 13 (Wing Thye Woo, Jeffrey D. Sachs, & Klaus 
Schwab, eds. YEAR) ("The World Bank and International Monetary Fund ... are now 
divided on the causes of the crisis, and on what the policy advice should have been given."). 
But see Paul Krugman, The Myth of Asia 's Miracle, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 62, 64 (1994) 
( explaining, before the Asian Crisis began, that the rapid Asian growth that occurred at the 
beginning of the l 990's was not a model that the West should follow, and that future growth 
would be limited). 
247. JOMO K.S., GROWTH AFTER THE ASIAN CRISIS: WHAT REMAINS OF THE EAST 
ASIAN MODEL? 2 (March 2001 ), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/pogdsmdpbg24dl0.en.pdf.; see also STIGLITZ, supra note 1, 
at 6 (arguing how decisions concerning necessary reforms in global institutional 
arrangements must be made not by a self selected group such as the G-7, G-8, G-10, G-20, 
or G-24, but should be made by all the countries of the world). 
248. STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 13. 
249. MANUEL F. MONTES, THE CURRENCY CRISIS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1 (2000) (listing 
four competing explanations of the Asian financial crisis). The four explanations are: the 
entry of low cost producers into the international export markets; macroeconomic weakness 
in all economies; undisciplined banking; or the shear differences between all of the different 
countries' economies. Id.; see Laurent L. Jacque, The Asian Financial Crisis: Lessons from 
Thailand, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 87 (1999) ("[T]he Asian crisis primarily originated 
in the private sector. It is a crisis of flawed resource allocation abetted by misguided 
government policies and unfortunately corrected by Western style policies often ill- adapted 
to the idiosyncrasies of Asian capitalism."). 
250. SACHS & Woo, supra note 246, at 13 (explaining the confusion among experts as 
to how the financial crisis occurred even after analysts had been praising Asian economies 
up until the unexpected collapse in July 1997). 
251. MORRIS GOLDSTEIN, THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CURES, AND SYSTEMIC 
IMPLICATIONS 7 (1998); see Helen Hughes, Crony Capitalism and the East Asian Currency 
Financial 'Crises', POLICY (Spring 1999) available at 
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of bank and nonbank credit to the private sector exceeded ... the already 
rapid growth of real GDP ... , [and] exposure to the property sector 
accounted for roughly twenty-five to forty percent of total bank loans in 
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, and more than that in 
Hong Kong."252 With an overextension and concentration of credit, 
countries became vulnerable to shifts in cyclical and credit conditions. 
By the end of 1997, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, 
and the Philippines' stock markets had lost more than sixty percent of 
their value. 2 3 "[T]he Indonesian rupiah was down more than 80 
percent against the dollar, and the currencies of Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Philippines all fell by 30-50 percent; . . . [ w ]ithin months of the baht 
flotation, the stock markets of all four saw losses of sixty percent or 
more in dollar terms. "254 Most surprisingly affected by the crisis was 
South Korea, because at the onset it was the most rapidly growing 
country in the region and the eleventh biggest economy in the world, yet 
after the crisis hit, South Korea lost its credibility as it became known 
that its banks lacked "commercial orientation" and had made too many 
risky loans. 255 
At the center of some of the criticism before the crisis was the 
IMF, whose inappropriate advice "led to overly tight macroeconomic 
policies and badly designed and badly handled restructuring 
programs. "256 Besides persuading Thailand into devaluation, the IMF 
http://www.cis.org.au/POLICY /Spr99/polspr99- 1.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) 
( explaining that most East Asian banks did not adopt the proper accountability and 
transparency measures necessary to police loaning practices, thus a high proportion of those 
loans were non- performing). 
252. Id. at 8- 9 ( explaining that falling property prices and rising shares of 
nonperforming bank loans were a consequence of the ASEAN-4 economies being 
vulnerable to the shifts in credit and cyclical conditions). In an effort to minimize 
borrowing costs, too much of those countries' borrowing consisted of short maturities 
and/or foreign currency; an ultimately risky strategy as it contributed to currency 
mismatches. Id.; see Overview, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, 
available at http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) 
(providing an overview of ASEAN). 
253. Coclanis & Doshi, supra note 246, at 59 (describing these events as the "Asian 
flu" or "bahtulism"); see Jomo K.S., supra note 247, at 12 (discussing how the Republic of 
Korea's currency, the won, collapsed, and as a result, the Hong Kong dollar was directly 
attacked). 
254. Coclanis & Doshi, supra note 246, at 59; see Jomo K.S., supra note 247, at 12. 
255. John W. Head, Global Implications of the Asian Financial Crisis: Banking, 
Economic Integration, and Crisis Management in the New Century, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. 
Rev. 939, 945-46 (1999) (explaining how South Korea's financial difficulties basically 
forced it to accept an IMF bailout package in December 1997). At the time, South Korea's 
twenty- one billion dollar IMF loan was the largest the IMF ever made. Id. 
256. SACHS & Woo, supra note 246, at 14; see Hughes, supra note 251 (criticizing the 
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was alleged to have pressured Indonesia to devalue the rupiah, which 
also led to devaluation in the Philippines and South Korea, and the 
needless "debasing" of the Taiwan dollar. 257 The World Bank was not 
immune from criticism either, as just four years prior to the crisis it 
argued that Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia were the preferred 
models of economies for other developing countries to emulate. 258 Both 
the IMF and World Bank encouraged Asian countries to adopt a 
strategy known as "fast-track capitalism" which ended up putting 
countries in high-yield, yet high-risk sectors; this ultimately led to the 
crisis.259 
After the crisis broke, the IMF attempted to come to the countries' 
rescue by instituting "programmes and conditionalities, as well as 
policies favored by the international. .. financial communities and others 
affected. "260 Its three-point strategy was aimed toward financing, 
macroeconomic policy, and structural reform within Indonesia, South 
Korea, and Thailand.261 The IMF's programs "urged bank closures, 
IMF for funding countries that had balance of payment difficulties). This led to a moral 
hazard where private lenders and developing country borrowers relied upon the IMF for 
perpetual credit. Id. The author goes on to criticize the World Bank for giving loans to 
countries "that had no intention of following prudent economic policies." Id. 
257. Editorial, The IMF Crisis, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 1998, at A22 (describing the 
IMF's mishandling of Asia's economy). "The IMF tripped this crisis by urging the Thais to 
devalue, then, promoted contagion by urging everyone else to do likewise." Id. 
258. Jomo, supra note 247, at 1- 2 (explaining The East Asian Miracle study 
conducted by the World Bank in 1993 that the World Bank sought to distance itself from). 
The study concluded, in contrast to the majority of case- studies such as those in Latin 
America and Africa, that structural adjustment programs were working in East Asia. Id. 
259. Jomo, supra note 247, at 23- 24; see John W. Head, Lessons from the Asian 
Financial Crisis: The Role of the IMF and the United States, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 70, 
71 - 74 (1998) (detailing the IMF's bailout package broken down by country and dollar 
amounts); PETER G. ZHANG, IMF AND THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 73-74, 78 (World 
Scientific Publ'g Co. Pte. Lte.) (1998) (explaining, for example, how at the peak of the 
crisis, the IMF loaned South Korea fifty- eight billion dollars on December 4, 1997). The 
IMF's immediate response was to help Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand design programs of 
structural economic reforms to win investors' confidence. Id. The loans did not curb the 
financial crisis, because, for example, the South Korean won ended up falling to 1,745 wons 
for every U.S. dollar on January 23, 1998. Id. 
260. Recovery from the Asian Crisis and the Role of the IMF, INT'L MONETARY FUND 
(June 2000), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm#III (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2013) (listing the three components of the IMF's Asian crisis rescue plan). 
Although the IMF initially put in thirty- five billion dollars of support for Indonesia, K01:ea, 
and Thailand to be distributed equally, eventually, Indonesia got more money, in 1998 and 
1999. Id. The macroeconomic policies affected were monetary and fiscal policies. Id. 
Money was tightened to stop the collapse of each country's exchange rate and, especially in 
Thailand, fiscal policy was tightened to diminish deficit increases. Id. Finally, structural 
reforms were taken to address corporate and financial sector weaknesses. Id. 
261. Jomo, supra note 247, at 23- 24. 
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government spending cuts and higher interest rates in the wake of the 
crisis."262 In the end, the IMF's aid failed as the programs it instituted 
were contradictory in consequence and exacerbated the impact of the 
crisis in countless aspects. 263 
In a review of its handling of the Asian Crisis of 1997 to 1998, the 
IMF recognized that it needed to improve the infrastructure of the 
international financial system. 264 The IMF Managing Director, 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, echoed this realization by stating "the Fund 
has advocated fiscal stimulus to restore global growth; . . . [ t ]here is 
now a broad consensus on this. "265 The lessons of the Asian Crisis have 
not manifested themselves within the framework of the policy advice 
that has been directed toward countries battling the current economic 
262. Id.; see Editorial, Dousing the IMF Fires, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1998, at Al8. 
"Before you pour liquid on a raging fire ... make sure it doesn't smell like gasoline ... the 
IMF doesn't look like much of a fireman." Id. In March 1997, IMF Managing Director 
Michel Camdessus encouraged Thailand to devalue its currency, but as the Asian crisis 
proves, this was a huge mistake. Id. Then, the IMF gave eighteen billion to Thailand, 
forty- three billion to Indonesia, and fifty- seven billion to South Korea. Id. Those loans, 
coupled with loans to Russia and Brazil, totaled $171 billion from the beginning of the 
Asian Crisis through 1998 as the crisis continued. Id. In 1997, Camdessus predicted that 
the crisis would not be prolonged. Editorial, supra note 257. His prediction looked foolish 
for the IMF to have stood behind at the time. Id.; but see Letters to the Editor: A Gross 
Distortion of IMF's Policies, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1998, at A15 (discussing IMF External 
Relations Department Director Shailendra Anjaria's contention that the IMF did not force 
Thailand to devalue its currency). 
263. The IMF's Response to the Asian Crisis, INT'L MONETARY FUND, available at 
http://www.imf.org/External/np/exr/facts/asia.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) ( explaining 
the six major areas where the IMF should be strengthened: (1) more effective surveillance 
over countries' economic practices and policies; (2) financial sector reform; (3) ensuring 
orderly and properly sequenced integration of international financial markets; (4) promoting 
regional surveillance; (5) promoting good governance and fighting corruption; and (6) more 
effective structures for orderly debt workouts). 
264. Neil Watkins, The London G- 20 Summit: The Global New Deal We Need, 
JUBILEE USA NETWORK at 3 (Mar. 3, 2009), available at 
http://www.jubileeusa.org/fileadmin/user _ upload/Resources/G20/Briefing_ note_ G20 Lond 
on_Summit.pdf (last visited on Oct. 22, 2013) (quoting Managing Director of the IMF, 
Dominique Strauss- Kahn). 
265. See id. at 4 ( discussing the recent history of the IMF in its loans to Serbia, El 
Salvador, Latvia, and Hungary). Serbia was told that anything less than a tight fiscal stance 
would jeopardize the credibility of the program in the eyes of foreign investors and the 
Serbian public. Id. A loan to El Salvador in January of 2009 advocated the attainment of 
ec,momic growth through the administering of tax increases and diminishing gas and 
transport subsidies. Id. In funding a December 2008 loan to Latvia, the lending was 
contingent upon reduction in many government related expenditures as well as the 
incorporation of a value added tax. Id. The implementing of stringent fiscal deficit and 
inflation targets were also a critical component of the loan to Hungary in November 2008. 
Watkins, supra note 264, at 4. The IMFs polices toward developing countries differ from its 
policies toward developed countries. Id. 
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crisis. 266 The nature of the conditions attached to the loans symbolizes 
the unresponsiveness and systematic inability of the IMF to avoid the 
historic cyclical pattern of providing loans to those without the 
sufficient financial and economic systems set in place to provide for 
timely repayment, the cost of which has been nothing less than a 
country's sovereignty. 267 
IV. OTHER CHALLENGES TO THE BWIS 
A. Challenge of the Monterrey Consensus 
In 2002, the BWis conjured a recipe of false hope through their 
participation in and subsequent lack of commitment to the Monterrey 
Consensus ("Consensus"). 268 Prior to the Consensus, the World Bank 
was criticized because many of its low-interest loans went to corrupt 
governments who were not held responsible when no accounting could 
be given for the money.269 The IMF was criticized for its expensive 
rescue operations, and for giving too little attention to improving 
financial structures in developing countries. 270 
266. See PAUL BLUSTEfN, THE CHASTENING: INSIDE THE CRISIS THAT ROCKED THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND HUMBLED THE IMF 382 (Pub.Affairs) (2003) (suggesting 
that instead of attaching conditions, loans should only go to countries that pre-qualify by 
adhering to certain banking standards); see also infra Part IV. 
267. See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 84 (proposing countercyclical lending to countries 
in distress in order to stabilize the suffering economies); see id. (stating how lending at 
higher rates in a cyclical manner will infringe upon the economic recovery of the nation). 
The policies pushed by the international financial institutions are now seen as having 
contributed to the lack in confidence in these institutions and the loan conditionalities they 
imposed. See id. at 110. 
268. Editorial, Forging the Monterrey Consensus, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2002, § 4 at 
14 (explaining criticisms aimed at the World Bank and other international development 
bodies because the aid doled out by those institutions to countries made no great progress in 
those countries at eliminating poverty) [hereinafter Forging the Monterrey Consensus]; see 
Susanne Soederberg, Recasting Neoliberal Dominance in the Global South? A Critique of 
the Monterrey Consensus, ALTERNATIVES: GLOBAL, LOCAL, POL., Vol. 30, No. 3, 325 (July-
Sept. 2005) (explaining how the World Bank found a seventy-three percent failure rate in 
Africa); see also supra (explaining the Monterrey Consensus conference). The Monterrey 
Consensus set a priority for combating corruption at all levels, reaffirmed at the Doha 
Conference. See Draft Outcome Document on the Follow-up International Conference on 
Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus, 
Submitted by the President of the General Assembly in Accordance with General Assembly 
Resolution 62/187: Doha Outcome Document on Reviewing the Implementation of the 
Monterrey Consensus, UNITED NATIONS (Jul. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/doha/draftoutcome/Draft:OutcomeDoc _ English.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 21, 20 l 3)[hereinafter General Assembly Resolution 62/187]. 
269. Forging the Monterrey Consensus, supra note 268. 
270. See General Assembly Resolution 55/2, Monterrey Consensus (Mar. 22, 2002), 
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The Consensus sought to establish a common ground for 
developed and developing countries to converge in an effort to stabilize 
and grow the global economy in pursuit of the MDG's development 
objectives.271 The atmosphere leading into Monterrey was built upon 
several factors: the 1997 economic crisis in South East Asia;272 
international financial institutions ("IFis") were not acting as neutral 
and independent public authorities; the Consensus' precursor, the 
Washington Consensus, 273 was "not solely political in nature, but had its 
roots in the changing nature of the world economy;"274 and "growing 
reprinted in Financing/or Development: Building on Monterrey, UNITED NATIONS 9 (2002), 
available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/Building%20on%20Monterrey.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Building on Monterrey]. As a result, the IMF attempted 
reorganization in its fight against poverty with lowering demands for loan approval. Id.; see 
M.L. NARASAIAH, MICROCREDIT AND RURAL POVERTY 103----04 (Discovery Publ'g House) 
(2006) ( explaining that structural- adjustment programs were replaced by Poverty-
Reduction Strategy Papers). 
271. The Consensus contains six thematic "chapters" for action, including one devoted 
to external-debt-relief. See Building on Monterrey, supra note 270, at VII- X. 
272. See id.; Akila Weerapana, Lecture 23: The IMF and Its Critics, Spring 2003 & 
2004, WELLESLEY, available at 
http://www.wellesley.edu/Economics/weerapana/econ213/econ213pdf/lect213-23.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2013). Following the East Asia crisis, the IMF imposed conditions on the 
Indonesian government to get fiscal spending under control. Id. Rather than using financial 
aid to put an end to widespread corruption, the Indonesian government was forced to 
remove food and fuel subsidies, a blow to the poor in Jakarta. Id. The IMF was further 
criticized for allowing devaluation to occur, stating this was the catalyst to the crisis. Id. 
The IMF should be helping countries defend their currencies, rather than devaluing them. 
Id. The IMF required high interest rates in exchange for bailouts. Weerapana, supra; see 
Paul Blustein, World Bank Turns Up Criticism of the IMF, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 1998), 
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/209/43 528.html (last 
visited on Oct. 21, 2013). Although the institutions usually work in tandem, the World 
Bank lending for long-term and the IMF short-term relief, this rift marked a growing 
separation between Europe and the United States of America. See General Assembly 
Resolution 62/18, supra note 268. 
273. Soederberg, supra note 268 (explaining the Washington Consensus as the neo-
liberalistic policy of the IFis, such as the IMF and World Bank, that believed political and 
social problems should not be solved through state intervention and instead through market-
based mechanisms). 
274. See Soederberg, supra note 268 (discussing three caveats leading to the 
Monterrey consensus). The heavily skewed IMF voting power and United States 
dominance within the World Bank's standby capital were examples of how IFis are not 
natural and independent authorities. Id. The roots of the Washington consensus being in 
the changing nature of the economy meant that policies were created as a reaction to the 
crisis of overproduction and thus there was a growing dependence of corporations, 
governments, and consumers on debt financing. Id. Finally, the policies of the Bush 
administration led to overproduction because performance-based grants were intrinsically 
tied to the efforts to maintain U.S. competitiveness and dominant position in the world 
economy. Id. Thus, tax cuts and government spending, coupled with a fear of public 
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protectionism, unilateralism, and fiscal overrun pursued by the Bush 
administration" created a crisis of overproduction, which was not 
simply a reaction to the events of September 11, 2001. 275 
Preparation for the Consensus spanned four years of "patient 
consensus-building work. "276 By the end of the fourth preparatory 
meeting for the Monterrey Conference, all participants endorsed the 
Monterrey Consensus. 277 The Zedillo report, 278 prepared by a panel of 
backlash by policymakers wary of criticizing the administration's budget, led to a rise in 
debt levels. Id 
275. Calls Heard for Increased Aid to Reduce Poverty at Monterrey Conference on 
Development Financing, UNITED NATIONS, Mar. 21, 2002, available at 
http://www.un.org/ffd/pressrel/2lc.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) (explaining how 
September 11 tore down the invisible wall dividing rich and poor worldwide) [hereinafter 
Calls Heard for Aid]. The Monterrey Conference should serve to rebuild confidence lost in 
the international economy and system as a result of 9/11/01 events. See id.; Group of 77 
Plays Key Role in Monterrey Consensus on FFD, G77, available at 
http://www.g77.org/news/monterrey.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Group of 
77]. "Greater confidence should lead to higher investments and stronger recovery as well as 
concrete measures in international trade and better prices for primary commodities. " Group 
of 77, supra. Since then, re-development in the world's poorest societies as taken on a sense 
of urgency because "although not a direct cause of terrorism, 'poverty breeds frustration and 
resentment ... particularly in those countries in which poverty is coupled with a lack of 
political rights and basic freedoms."' Calls Heard for Aid, supra note 276; see Lan Cao, 
Cultural Change, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 357, 363 (2007) (citing Colin Powell, No Country Left 
Behind, FOREIGN PoL'Y Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 30); see also Soederberg, supra note 268 
(discussing three caveats leading to the Monterrey consensus). The heavily skewed IMF 
voting power and United States dominance within the World Bank's standby capital were 
examples of how IFis are not natural and independent authorities. Calls Heard for Aid, 
supra. The roots of the Washington consensus being in the changing nature of the economy 
meant that policies were created as a reaction to the crisis of overproduction and thus there 
was a growing dependence of corporations, governments, and consumers on debt financing. 
Id. Finally, the policies of the Bush administration led to overproduction because 
performance-based grants were intrinsically tied to the efforts to maintain U.S. 
competitiveness and dominant position in the world economy. Id. Thus, tax cuts and 
government spending, coupled with a fear of public backlash by policymakers wary of 
criticizing the administration's budget, led to a rise in debt levels. Id. 
276. Building on Monterrey, supra note 270, at vii. The Paris Club has since become 
a highly- popular bilateral institution supplying multiple avenues of debt relief to many low-
income developing countries. See Club de Paris, available at 
http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). Under most administrations, a 
common thread has been the identification and focus on enhancing long- term development 
goals. See JOHN R. ERIKSSON, TOWARD COUNTRY- LED DEVELOPMENT: A MULTI- PARTNER 
EVALUATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 25 (2003). Nations were 
encouraged to lead a strong commitment and ownership of national strategies. Id. 
277. See Ernesto Zedillo, Report of the High- Level Panel on Financing for 
Development, U.N., available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/a55-1000.pdf (last visited Oct. 
30, 2013) [hereinafter "Zedillo Report"]. The MDGs can only be reached if developed 
countries increased aid by $50 dollars per year. Id. 
278. Barbara Crossette, No Headline, N.Y. TIMES, July l, 2001 at 6 (discussing the 
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the world's leading financial and development experts, 279 was reviewed 
by the preparatory committee and indicated that restructuring the 
international financial architecture was a crucial issue in attaining the 
MDGs.280 
External-debt relief, in addition to other goals and challenges of 
financing for development, was not a novel idea to the heads of State 
and Government at the international conference281 in Monterrey, 
Mexico.282 External debt damaged countries by consuming resources 
that could be used for public services and poverty eradication. 283 Thus, 
the focal point of the development committee's meeting at Monterrey 
was ensuring commitment to lifting more people from poverty and 
allowing them to reap benefits associated with globalization and 
economic development. 284 The challenging plan set forth by the BWis 
recommendations put forth in the Zedillo report as setting an objective of free trade to take 
place between industrial and developing countries, as it already had between industrial 
countries). See Zedillo Report, available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/a55-l 000.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2013) (describing the key issues in the Zedillo Report, which include 
mobilizing domestic financial resources, foreign investment, trade, official development 
assistant (ODA), external debt and the international financial architecture); see also World 
Bank and IMF Roles Debated at Development Finance Summit, available at 
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-16170 (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) [ hereinafter 
Roles Debated]. 
279. Roles Debated, supra note 278. 
280. See Development Finance Summit a Fiasco: Say Campaigners, BRETTON Wooos 
PROJECT (Mar. 25, 2002), available at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art- 16172 (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Development Finance Summit]. 
281. The summit marked the culmination of four years of "patient consensus-building 
work." See Soren Ambrose, Social Movements and the Politics of Debt Cancellation, 
ALLB USINESS, available at http://www. al lbusiness.com/ accounting/ debt/883 63 9-1. html (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
282. BUILDING ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at vii (explaining that the heads of 
State and Government met March 18- 22, 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico to discuss and finalize 
implementation of the Consensus). 
283. BUILDING ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 25. "We must do our utmost to 
ensure that people at the local level understand this process, are engaged, and have the 
means to take advantage of its opportunities." Id. Criticism at the NGO Global forum 
stated "Monterrey ... is an example of the negative impacts of globalization on people, 
particularly the high social costs of production of the large-scale enterprises." Id. at 307. 
Rather than focusing on privatization and neo- liberal tactics, which incur substantial micro-
economic harms, the focus should be on developing world- wide economy based on human 
rights and environmental protections. See id. 
284. See Trevor Manuel, Remarks at the International Conference on Financing for 
Development (Mar. 18, 2002), http://www.un.org/ffd/statements/cdcE.htm (last visited Oct. 
12, 2013); see also Inclusive Globalization, United Nations Development Program on 
Poverty Reduction, available at http://www.undp.org/poverty/inclglob.htm (last visited Oct. 
12, 2013) [hereinafter Inclusive Globalization]. Chairman Manuel noted that although the 
consensus for cooperation between developed and developing countries were strong, so was 
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involved commandeering globalization to advance the goal of poverty 
reduction. 285 Chairman Trevor Manuel stated that "[ r ]eform of 
international financial governance is critical to ensuring developing 
countries benefit from globalization through participation. "286 
Challenges in achieving debt-relief changed institution objectives from 
"achieving a permanent exit from debt rescheduling ... to removing the 
debt overhang within a reasonable time and providing a base from 
which to achieve debt sustainability."287 
Since halving poverty was the cornerstone of the MDGs, 288 the 
primary focus in formulating the Consensus was to address the 
commonly occurring "shortfalls in resources required to achieve the 
internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in 
the United Nations Millennium Declaration (the "Declaration")."289 At 
the conference, the "performance-driven aid"290 initiative was heavily 
supported through the two-tiered lending structure of the Highly 
the risk of failing to implement the Consensus. Id. The BWis envision globalization as the 
solution to poverty, and their neo- liberal practices as its antidote. See Joseph Yu, Has 
Globalization eased global poverty?, CHOIKE.ORG, Aug. 2005, 
http://www.choike.org/nuevo _ eng/informes/3316.html. The BWis claim ineffective 
integration of low- income countries rather than globalization has caused the onslaught of 
global poverty. See id. "Although globalization brought overall net benefits and was also 
contributing to poverty reduction, its growth effects were unequally distributed, and so far it 
had contributed little to greater gender equality. As a result, progress towards the 
Millennium Development Goals differed considerably across regions and countries." Id.; 
see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Accra, Ghana, Apr. 20- 24, 
2008, Globalization, Development, and Poverty Reduction- Their Social and Gender 
Dimensions, U.N. Doc. TD/L.405, available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/tdl405_en.pdf. 
285. Remarks at the International Conference on Financing for Development, supra 
note 284;see also Inclusive Globalization, supra note 284; Poverty Reduction, UNITED 
NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, http://www.undp.org/poverty/inclglob.htm (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
286. Id. See A. GESKE DIJKSTRA, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT RELIEF 107 
(2007). 
287. Calls Heard for Aid, supra note 275. 
288. Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for 
Development, UNITED NATIONS (2002), available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) 
[hereinafter International Conference on Financing and Development]. 
289. Sophie Smith & Anna Triponel, Development Goals and Indicators: Education 
as a Lynchpin for Development: Legal and Policy Considerations in the Formation of 
Education for All - Fast Track Catalytic Trust Fund, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & PoL'Y 8, 8 
(2005) ( "international development aid should follow and support clear evidence of 
commitment to reform and improvement on the part of the recipient country"). 
290. See Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, 
INT'L MONETARY FUND, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2013); see also The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, THE WORLD 
BANK, available at http://go.worldbank.org/XLE8KKLEXO (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
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Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (the "HIPC").291 The Consensus also 
called for international financial institutions and bilateral agencies to 
"scale-up."292 The main emphasis was "broadening and strengthening 
the role of developing countries in international economic decision-
making and norm setting. "293 
Crucial to this objective was a financial structure and system that 
could be beneficial, purposeful, and feasible in facilitating the stated 
21st century values. 29 The Consensus sought the formulation of a "new 
partnership between developed and developing countries,"295 fueled by 
the fundamental values expressed in the Declaration. 296 It promoted the 
values of freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature, and 
shared responsibility 97• as essential for survival in the 21st century 
international arena. 
"Sustainable debt financing is an important element for mobilizing 
resources for public and private investment. "298 The Consensus 
promoted the idea of accountability, stating "[ d]ebtor and creditor 
countries should be mutually responsibility for preventing and resolving 
un-sustainable debt situations. "2 9 The BWis' critical role, in addition 
to facilitating lending venues, was to provide "technical assistance for 
external debt management and debt tracking. " 300 
Several opinions regarding the facilitation of worldwide debt 
291. Id. 
292. BUILDING ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 3. 
293. See United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. GAOR, 55th 
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 4, U.N. Doc. N55/49 (2000), available at 
http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm [hereinafter Millennium 
Declaration]. Development and poverty eradication "depends on good governance at the 
international level and on transparency in the financial, monetary and trading systems." Id. 
"We are committed to an open, equitable, rule- based, predictable and non- discriminatory 
multilateral trading and financial system." Id. 
294. International Conference on Financing and Development, supra note 288. 
295. Millennium Declaration, supra note 293. The declaratiO'll was a re- affirmation of 
the original charter of the United Nations. See id. In addition to the original principles of 
human dignity, equality, and equity, the Millennium Declaration sought to expand their 
perspective to ascertain the needs of a developing global economy. See id. 
296. See Millennium Declaration, supra note 293. Responsibility for managing 
worldwide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and 
security, must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised 
multilaterally. Id. As the most universal and most representative organization in the world, 
the United Nations must play the central role. Id. 
297. See BUILDING ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 4. 
298. Id. at 9. 
299. Id. at 219. 
300. Calls Heard for Aid, supra note 275. 
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reduction were presented at the Consensus. 301 The developed nations 
and developing countries held differing views on how debt should be 
reduced. Norway's Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik informed 
delegates that the Norwegian government planned to increase official 
development assistance from .92% to 1 % of GDP by 2005, advance 
policy coherence, and forgive all debts to countries under the HIPC. 302 
Most donor countries only provided 0.22% of GDP, with only five 
countries reaching the 0.70% target. 303 Former U.S. President George 
W. Bush proposed, "development resources should be distributed fifty 
percent for grants and fifty percent for loans."304 The approach to 
cancellation of debts expressed by NGOs attending the conference was 
heavily ignored. 305 
Developing countries held strong views about how poverty 
reduction should have been accomplished. 306 Small island nations 
301. See id 
302. See id. By the rate at which it was improving at the time of the conference, the 
ODA would only reach 0.7% in 2032. See id The European Union was only contributing 
0.27%, pledging to increase its contribution to 0.33% at the EU Barcelona Summit. See id.; 
see Small Steps Towards More Development Aid: Financing for Development Conference 
Finishes in Monterrey, OUTREACH 2002 (Mar. 25, 2002), available at 
www.earthsummit2002.org/es/newsletter/Issue%2020.rtf. 
303. See Calls Heard for Aid, supra note 275. Proposed increase in development 
assistance by the United States was projected to reach "a $5 Billion annual increase over 
current levels." Id see BUILDING ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 113; see also Stephen 
Marks, U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights: The Human Right to Development: Between 
Rhetoric and Reality, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 137, 156- 57 (2004) (discussing Bush's speech 
at Monterrey). Bush said that developed nations had duties to share wealth and encourage 
sources that produce wealth such as economic freedom, human rights, rule of law, and 
political liberty. Id. 
304. See BUILDING ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 308. "[A] fair and transparent 
process ofarbitration" should be used to cancel "external debt of countries of the south." Id 
"All forms of conditionality should be eliminated, such as tied aid, and food aid, which 
undermines the productive capacity, and food security of countries." Id 
305. See World Economic Outlook: Database WEO Groups and Aggregates 
Information, INT'L MONETARY FUND (Oct. 2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/weodata/groups.htm#oem (listing 
emerging and developing economies as well as advanced economies) (last visited Oct. 15, 
2013). 
306. Gaston Browne, Minister of Planning Implementation and Pub. Serv. Affairs of 
Ant. & Barb., Statement at the International Conference on Finance for Development, (Mar. 
22, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/ffd/statements/aabE.htm (explaining how 
developing countries wanted to make sure the Consensus would catapult developed 
countries into action instead of being just another "talk shop") (last visited Oct. 15, 2013); 
see Eduardo Duhalde, President of the Arg., Statement at International Conference on 
Financing for Development (Mar. 21, 2002), available at 
http://www.un.org/ffd/statements/argentinaE.htm (stating: "the gap between many emerging 
economies and developed countries has not been reduced[,] and [ o ]n the contrary, it seems 
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pushed for the international community to expand the HIPC. 307 African 
developing countries stressed that since most of their economies were 
based on exporting, the deterioration of trade had a negative impact on 
the balance of payments and thus, economic growth. 308 Donald 
Kaberuka, Rwanda's Minister for Financing and Economic Planning, 
stressed that aid alone would not eliminate poverty and that there should 
be greater integration of poor countries into world-wide trade and 
investment. 309 
To achieve the development objectives, including the MDGs, the 
U.N. members and the representatives from the BWis addressed six 
areas of financing for development that ultimately would become 
known as the Monterrey Consensus: (1) the mobilization of domestic 
financial resources for development; 310 (2) the mobilization of 
international resources for development through foreign direct 
deeper day by day") (last visited Oct. 15, 2013). 
307. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2007, 11, 13 (2007) 
( explaining that small island developing nations have special needs due to their particularly 
difficult geographic constraints, such as a small tax base, lack of natural resources, lack of 
access to ODA, substantially reduced foreign direct investment flows, and a lack of access 
to capital markets; several of these needs were addressed through the Programme of Action 
for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the 22nd special 
session of the General Assembly). 
308. Calls Heard for Aid, supra note 275 (discussing how creating sound 
environments, frameworks for investment, structural and government reforms, and 
transparency are all primary responsibilities of developing countries and aid should be 
secondary). 
309. Altai Efendiev, Chairman of the Delegation of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 
Statement to the International Conference on Financing for Development at Monterrey, 
Mexico (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/ffd/statements/azerbaijanE.htm. 
Id. 
Handling and managing the expected massive inflows of resources in a most 
efficient way, transform potentially high growth into sustainable development is one 
of the major challenges ... building up adequate institutional infrastructure, 
enhancing institutional capacities, introducing good-governance practices, pursuing 
radical structural and administrative reforms, implementing poverty reduction 
strategy, SME and non-oil sector development are ... the areas where the 
international assistance and expertise is most needed. 
310. See BUILDING ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 4. "In our common pursuit of 
growth, poverty eradication and sustainable development, a critical challenge is to ensure 
the necessary internal conditions for mobilizing domestic savings, both public and private, 
sustaining adequate levels of productive investment and increasing human capacity." Id. 
"An enabling domestic environment is vital for mobilizing domestic resources, increasing 
productivity, reducing capital flight, encouraging the private sector, and attracting and 
making effective use of international investment and assistance." Id. "We recognize the 
need to strengthen and develop the domestic financial sector, by encouraging the orderly 
development of capital markets ... addressing development financing needs, including the 
insurance sector and debt and equity markets." Id. 
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investment and other private flows; 311 (3) international trade as an 
engine for development;312 (4) increasing international financial and 
technical cooperation for development;313 (5) external debt;314 and (6) 
addressing systemic issues, including enhancement of the coherence and 
consistency of the international monetary, financial, and trading systems 
in support of development. 315 The ability of the BWis to contribute in 
311. See BUILDfNG ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 5. "We will support new 
public/private sector financing mechanisms, both debt and equity for developing countries 
and countries with economies in transition." Id. at 6. See Abdel H. Bouab, Comment, 
Financing for Development, the Monterrey Consensus: Achievements and Prospects, 
26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 359, 361 (2004). "Both domestic and international conditions are 
necessary to facilitate direct investment flows to Least Developed Countries ('LDCs')." Id.; 
see U.S.A. Gov't Submission, Review of the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for 
Development Feb. 15, 2008 Review Session on Mobilizing International Resources for 
Development: Foreign Direct Investment and Other Private Flows, available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/doha/chapter2/USA_submission.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) 
(stating each country is primarily responsible for maintaining its own economic 
environment and international institution support should be considered secondary). 
Although the benefits of foreign direct investment include "increase in employment, 
technological spill-overs, higher public revenue, and a positive impact on growth ... such 
benefits may be off- set by negative long- term balance- of- payments effects." Id.; see 
David Woodward, Foreign Direct Investment for Development?, G- 24,l, 
http://www.g24.org/PolicyBriefs/pbno23.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2013). "A clear 
distinction needs to be made between maximizing FDI flows and maximizing their 
contribution to development" in order to make effective use of funds. Id. at 2. 
312. See BUILDING ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 6. Trade is the single most 
important external source of development financing. See id. "We urge international 
financial institutions, including regional development banks, to continue to support projects 
that promote sub- regional and regional integration among developing countries and 
countries with economies in transition ... we invite multilateral and bilateral financial and 
development institutions to expand and coordinate their efforts." Id. at 7; see Bouab, supra 
note 311, at 362. 
313. See BUILDING ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 8. "We recognize that a 
substantial increase in ODA and other resources will be required if developing countries are 
to achieve the internationally agreed development goals and objectives, including those 
contained in the Millennium Declaration." Id. "There is a need for the multilateral ... 
development institutions to intensify efforts to . . . enhance the absorptive capacity and 
financial management of the recipient countries ... [ and] enhance recipient countries' input 
into and ownership of the design, including procurement, of technical assistance programs." 
Id.; see Bouab, supra note 311, at 363. 
314. See BUILDfNG ON MONTERREY, supra note 270, at 9. "External debt relief can 
play a key role in liberating resources that can then be directed towards activities consistent 
with attaining sustainable growth and development." Id. 
315. Id. at 10; see Bouab, supra note 311, at 365; UNITED NATIONS ECON. AND Soc. 
COUNCIL, ECON. AND Soc. COMM'N FOR ASIA AND THE PAC., Date, Venue and Theme Topic 
for the Sixty-First Session of the Commission, available at 
http://www.unescap.org/60/E/El327e.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). Commentators have 
suggested these six themes can actually be merged into four: (a) bringing about a substantial 
increase in the volume and effectiveness of foreign resource flows (private, bilateral, and 
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these areas, and particularly the sixth one which touches precisely on 
economic governance, was crucial to their viability. 316 
With public skepticism looming, 317 early criticisms regarding 
Monterrey were that it did not call for independent external evaluations 
of the performance of either the World Bank or the IMF, 318 and few 
initiatives were substantially generated to achieve the MDGs. 319 
Furthermore, insufficient attention was given to reforming the 
international financial institutions regarding composition and decision-
making process of the executive boards in dealing with debt relief. 320 In 
multilateral) in support of development, with a clear focus on poverty eradication; (b) 
setting up a fair, transparent, and ethical procedure and institutional framework for resolving 
external debt problems; (c) improving global economic governance to make it more 
participatory and accountable to a broader community of nations; and (d) creating an 
international trading environment that is more supportive of growth, in general, and the 
development of the poor, in particular. Id.; see Innamul Haque & Ruxandra Burdescue, 
Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development: Response Sought from International 
Economic Law, 27 B.C. INT'LCOMP. L. Rev. 219, 243-44 (2004). 
316. See Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA), THE MONTERREY 
CONSENSUS SIX YEARS LATER AND FfNANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND 
THE CARIBBEAN 9 (June 20, 2008), available at 
http://www.sela.org/DB/ricsela/EDOCS/SRed/2008/06/T023600002872-0-
Monterrey _Consensus_ six _years_ later_ and_ financing_ for_ development_ in_ LAC. pdf (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2013 ). "A real reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions is necessary ... 
[t]he boards of directors of these institutions must be restructured so as to increase the 
number of seats for least developed countries." Id. at 23. Others have stated the UN, rather 
than the BWis should take charge in restructuring worldwide finances. Id.; see Rbisso, U.N. 
Only Legitimate Body to Reform Financial System, IFIWATCH.NET (Nov. 22, 2008), 
available at http://www.ifiwatchnet.org/?q=en/node/26509 (last visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
317. See Development Finance Summit, supra note 280 ( explaining the skepticism as 
the product of the Monterrey Consensus being drafted in preparatory committees, and not 
being subject to any further negotiations). Thus, the predetermined nature of the 
Conference caused many civil society organizations to question their own, what was then, 
upcoming participation in the Conference. Id. 
318. Assessment of the FjD Outcome Paper and Proposed Next Steps, BRETTON 
WOODS PROJECT (Mar. 25, 2002), available at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-
16171 [hereinafter Assessment of the FjD]; see Independent Evaluations Office, available at 
http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/pages/ieohome.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) [hereinafter IEO] 
(discussing the IMF's Independent Evaluation Office ("IEO")). The IEO was established in 
2001 "to conduct independent and objective evaluations of Fund policies and activities." Id. 
The IEO is fully independent of IMF management and operates at arm's length from the 
Executive Directors. Id. The IEO's mission is to "[e]nhance the learning culture within the 
Fund, [s]trengthen the Fund's external credibility, [p]romote greater understanding of the 
work of the fund, and [s]upport institutional governance and oversight." Id. 
319. Development Finance Summit, supra note 280 ( explaining that civil society 
groups organized Foro Global, ahead of the Conference, to challenge the Monterrey 
Consensus). The Consensus was chastised for failing to propose any new ways to mobilize 
finances toward achieving the MDGs. Id. 
320. Assessment of the FJD, supra note 318. 
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response to criticisms, IMF Managing Director, Horst Koehler, 
proclaimed the underlying stigma of the new plan: "nothing will work 
without good governance."3 1 Under the HIPC, the IMF would 
contribute rehabilitation and stimulus loans once the poor countries took 
certain measures in evaluating and formulating their domestic 
policies.322 Priorities included: trade; a standard of 0.7% GNP for debt 
assistance; debt relief; and institutional capacity. 323 
With twenty-five years of failed structural adjustment programs for 
poverty reduction and the inability to assist major countries out of 
poverty crisis, 324 whether the IMF is truly in a position to command the 
correct administration of such funds towards developing counties is at 
issue. However, it is fair to recognize, given the traditional opposition 
321. Horst Koehler, Managing Dir. , Int'l Monetary Fund, Introductory Remarks at the 
International Conference on Financing for Development (Mar. 18, 2002), available at 
http://www.un.org/ffd/statements/imfE.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (stating poor 
countries should be ready to confront responsibility to their people before the international 
community can step in to bail them out); Horst Kohler: Biographical Iriformation, INT'L 
MONETARY FUND, available at, http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/bios/hk.htm (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2013). Horst Kohler served as Germany's Deputy Minister of Finance from 
1990 to 1993. Horst Kohler: Biographical Iriformation, INT' L MONETARY FUND, available 
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/bios/hk.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013). During that 
time, he led negotiations on behalf of the German government on the Maastricht treaty. Id. 
He was President of the German Savings Bank Association from 1993 to 1998, and in 
September 1998, he was appointed President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. Id. From May 2000 to March 2004 Kohler served as the Managing Director 
of the International Monetary Fund. Id. 
322. Horst Kohler: Biographical Information, INT'L MONETARY FUND, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/bios/hk.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013); see Rick 
Rowden, A World of Debt: Why "Debt Relief" has Failed to Liberate Poor Countries, AM. 
PROSPECT, July 1, 2001, at 29, available at 
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Reforming_ System/World_ of_ Debt.html (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2013) (criticizing the HIPC initiative). Although the HIPC framework invites 
NGOs and civic groups to consult with governments, there are not any clear guidelines as to 
how a legitimate NGO can be identified. Id. Governments in some countries had the ability 
to handpick who was allowed to participate in the poverty reduction process. Id. Legitimate 
NGOs have called this process a joke. Id. 
323. Rowden, supra note 322. Even the IMF doubted its capacity to provide assistance 
to poor countries. Id. A draft resolution by the economic and financial committee, in a 
follow- up meeting to the Monterrey Consensus held in 2005, urged for time tables to stage 
increments for developed countries to achieve 0.7% GDP, reaching 0.5% by 2010. See Press 
Release, United Nations, Second Comm. Approves Draft Resolution Underlying Need to 
Improve Commitments of Monterrey Consensus, GA/EF/3141 (Dec. 20, 2005), available at 
http://www. unis. unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2005/gaef3 l 4 l .html (last visited Oct. 21, 
2013). 
324. IMF Support for Low-Income Countries, INT'L MONETARY FUND (Sept. 30, 
2013), available at, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/poor.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) [hereinafter 
IMF and Poor Countries] . 
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of industrial countries to discuss international financial and monetary 
matters in a UN setting, the Monterrey Conference, and the resulting 
Consensus, constituted an unprecedented blueprint for action that would 
bring the Bretton Woods agencies, historically dominated just by 
Finance Ministries, into much closer touch with broader political 
decision makers. 
B. The Challenge of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
In response to criticism of their development approach and 
structural-adjustment policies, the BWis ended an eleven-year 
productivity drought with the formation of the HIPC. 325 With its 
establishment in 1996 and doubling in 1999, the HIPC provides 
comprehensive debt-relief 326 assistance to countries qualified to receive 
aid from the International Development Association (the "IDA"). 327 To 
eliminate poverty, the mission was to promote local government 
spending on public services such as healthcare and education, and for 
relief to include multi-lateral creditors, such as the IMF and World 
Bank.328 Unfortunately, commentators correctly predicted real debt 
relief provided by the HIPC would be substantially lower than 
325. BARBARA P. THOMAS-SLAYTER, SOUTHERN EXPOSURE: INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2003) (discussing 
how the HIPC doubled through the Enhanced HIPC Initiative). For the World Bank's 
description of the HIPC and links to the HIPC At- A- Glance Guide and Status of 
Implementation see (HIPC) The Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, THE 
WORLD BANK, available at http://go.worldbank.org/85B908KVEO (last visited Oct. 22, 
2013). 
326. LEONIE F. GUDER, THE ADMINISTRATION OF DEBT RELIEF BY INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: A LEGAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THE HIPC INITIATIVE 2 (2009) 
( defining debt relief as "a restructuring of debt that contains an element of forgiveness or 
reduction, thus relieving the overall debt burden of a country"). Although providing relief, 
as opposed to extending loans, is a drastic tum from concessional lending structures of the 
past, the HIPC conditions ultimately reveal similar development goals. Id. at 28- 29. In 
addition to the World Bank and IMF, there are eighteen lenders affiliated with the HIPC. 
See id. at 48. The debts relieved are "official debts" because they are owed by governments 
or state- owned enterprises. Id. Half of the debt relief will be provided by bilateral funding 
and the other cancelled by the BWis. Id. at 49. 
327. THOMAS- SLAYTER, supra note 325, at 175 (discussing that qualification includes 
an unsustainable debt burden, limited exports, low foreign currency reserves, and other 
limited resources). Of the qualified countries, eighty percent are in Africa. Id.; see also Part 
IV for regional case studies involving countries which qualify for the HIPC. 
328. Sanjee Gupta et al., Bulletin of the World Health Organization, SCIELO PUBLIC 
HEAL TH, available at http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?script=sci _ arttext&pid=S0042-
96862002000200011 (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) (discussing fiscal policy issues related to 
debt relief in twenty- three countries that reached their decision point under the HIPC 
framework). 
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anticipated. 329 
The BWis began the HIPC initiative for the purpose of assisting 
poor countries that were sustaining potentially unmanageable amounts 
of debt. 330 The World Bank administers a trust fund, separate from its 
own resources, financed and administered by external donors, allowing 
for the leveraging of poverty-reduction programs by providing 
expanding development collaboration, including technical assistance, 
advisory services, debt relief, and co-financing. 331 In response to harsh 
criticism of the qualifying criteria for the original HIPC, the IMF 
initiated and advanced a version of the Initiative in 1999. 332 
In 2004, the World Bank stated: "the enhanced HIPC initiative 
provides an opportunity to strengthen the economic prospects and 
poverty reduction efforts of its beneficiary countries."333 Nevertheless, 
329. Daniel Cohen, The HIPC Initiative: True and False Promises 5 (OECD Dev. 
Centre, Working Paper No. 166, 2000). Furthermore, the G-7 Leaders have expressed doubt 
stating: 
[N]ot all creditors have agreed to reduce their HIPC debts; the expected financing 
needs for the initiative have not been met, and as a result of weaker growth and 
export commodity prices, a number of countries could be at risk of not having 
sustainable debt loads at the Completion Point. 
G-7 Leaders at Kananaskis Summit, supra. The leaders encouraged the BWis to seek 
assistance from both regional and multilateral development institutions. Id. Furthermore, 
they requested the institutions seek additional assistance and availability from internal 
resources. Id. The leaders of the G-8 committed to contribute $1 billion to the initiative. 
Id. 
330. See Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, 
INT'L MONETARY FUND, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Debt Relief Under HIPC]; see also Eugenia McGill, 
Poverty and Social Analysis of Trade Agreements: A More Coherent Approach?, 27 B.C. 
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 371, 380 (2004) ("The initiative was the result of a civil- society 
campaign for meaningful external debt relief to free up scarce financial resources to address 
HIV/AIDS and other social development needs."). 
331. John R. Crook, United States Supports G- 7 Decisions to Reduce Debt Burden of 
Poor Countries, Including Those Affected by December 2004 Tsunamis, 99 AM. J. INT'L. L. 
500, 501 (2005); Bonnie D. Jenkins, et. al., International Institutions, 37 INT'L LAW. 609 
(2003). The United States has repeatedly encouraged other bilateral creditors to follow it on 
providing 100 percent loan forgiveness for MDB soft loans to the HIPCs. Id. 
332. Robin Goldberg, Financing Developments and the Desperate Need for Debt 
Relief, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 969, 969 (2001 ); Elizabeth Justice, The African Union: 
Building A Dream to Facilitate Trade, Development, and Debt Relief, 12 CURRENTS: INT'L 
TRADE L.J. 127, 130-31 (2003) (explaining that at its inception in 1996, only 5 countries 
qualified for the HIPC). 
333. Bouab, supra note 311, at 365. "When default becomes inescapable, the debts 
that governments cannot pay are almost always owed in foreign currency ... an inability to 
stay current on payments on external debt causes deep economic trauma." Barry Herman, 
Doing the Right Thing: Dealing with Developing Country Sovereign Debt, 32 N.C.J. INT'L 
L. & COM. REG. 773, 775 (2007). During the time building up to the Monterrey Consensus, 
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as of 2009, of the two trillion dollars owed by developing countries, 
about $250 billion is owed by nations that were given "low income" 
status. 334 Critics claim that although the program has good intentions, 
the program is inadequate because it does not force debtor nations to 
adequately reduce poverty or provide basic health care and education 
for their citizens. 33 Irrespective of these shortcomings, budget cuts are 
often incurred in these areas to meet stringent demands for receiving 
debt relief. 336 
Currently, thirty-eight states are recognized as HIPC qualified. 337 
The initiative provides low-interest loans and debt relief to reduce 
external debt payments and achieve levels sustainable for countries to 
reach "completion point."338 Factors for considering whether a country 
fifty- six countries had "arrearages in their foreign debt payments or rescheduled their debt-
servicing obligations . .. accounting for one- fifth of world's population, over one billion 
people, but less than six percent of world's gross product." Id. at 776. Middle- income 
countries such as Argentina, the Dominican Republic, and Iraq have also restructured debts 
they could no longer service. See id. "While the IMF has usually assumed the role of 
international arbiter of how much relief, new financing, and policy reform a country needs 
to overcome its debt crisis, it has been widely accused of systematically underestimating the 
amount of relief needed." Id. at 779. There may be systematic bias for countries following 
IMF policy advice. See id. 
334. David Ricksecker, What is the HIPC Initiative?, UNIV. OF IOWA CTR. FOR INT' L 
FIN. AND DEV. (Sept. 21 , 2006), available at 
http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/faq/faq_docs/HIPC.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) 
( describing how without major debt reduction, poor income countries are trapped and stuck 
making endless interest payments on debts). Since inception of the initiative, Guyana is the 
only country that has successfully been removed from the list of heavily indebted poor 
countries. See DIJKSTRA, supra note 286, at 107. The problem with achieving sustainability 
through the HIPC is evident in its qualification methods: almost ten countries have not even 
reached the decision point and eight more have not reached completion. See id. 
335. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Insolvency Principles and the Odious Debt Doctrine: 
The Missing Link in the Debate, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 59 (2007). 
336. UNITED NATIONS, WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATIONS AND PROSPECTS 77 (2009), 
available at http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp2009files/wesp2009.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2013). This would require the reduction in poverty to mirror the release of 
government-subsidized programs. Id. 
33 7. INT' L MONETARY FUND, F ACTSHEET- DEBT RELIEF UNDER THE HEAVILY INDEBTED 
POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC) INITIATIVE (Oct. 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2013). See 
Dickerson, supra note 335, at 59 (explaining that qualification requires eligible nations to 
have a current track record of satisfactory performance under a Poverty Reduction Strategy, 
an IMF program, or an interim PRS in place). An agreed plan must also be in place to clear 
any outstanding debts to foreign creditors. Id. 
338. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 337 (describing the two-step process 
which countries must follow for HIPC Initiative assistance). The completion point is the 
second and final step where, upon completion, a country is allowed to receive its full debt 
relief committed at decision point. Id. 
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is heavily indebted include "a nation's total outstanding debt relative to 
exports and GDP, as opposed to rations of debt service expenses to 
government revenues." 3 Furthermore, qualification is conditional 
upon the governments' abilities to attain a range of economic 
management and performance targets as set and agreed upon with either 
the World Bank or the IMF. 340 
As the 'gatekeeper' for development assistance, the IMF requires 
HIPC countries to prepare and submit Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (the "PRSPs") for approval, prior to receiving loans or debt 
relief. 341 However, this type of loan-bargaining structure often ends up 
one-sided, placing the IMF in a totalitarian position regarding budget 
cuts in the debtor countries, 342 and thereby limiting availability of 
339. See Charles Seavey, The Anomalous Lack of an International Bankruptcy Court, 
24 BERKLEY J. INT'L L. 499, 504 (2006). These standards "penalize countries with: (i) low 
government tax revenues relative to exports or GDP; and/or (ii) high debt service relative to 
total outstanding debt." Id. at 517. 
340. See Ambrose, supra note 281, at 272 ("[Governments] with questionable 
creditworthiness will only be considered eligible for grants, loans, or credits once the IMF 
has signaled its approval of the government's economic program."). 
341. See Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers Fact Sheet, INT'L MONETARY FUND (Oct. 
4, 2013), http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp#H. PRSPs are prepared by member 
countries (of the BWls) and updated every three years. Id. PRSPs include annual progress 
reports, a description of macro and micro- economic policies and programs for promotion of 
growth and reduction of poverty. Id. Countries also provide interim PRSPs through the 
process of finalizing the fully-developed PRSPs. See id. See also Lisa Philipps & Miranda 
Stewart, Fiscal Transparency: Global Norms, Domestic Laws, and the Politics of Budgets, 
34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 797, 817- 21 (2009) ( explaining several accountability mechanisms, 
including PRSPs, that country donors have used to help strengthen and manage public 
finances and fiscal policy in aid- recipient countries). The PRSPs are meant to increase focus 
on poverty reduction while providing stronger collaboration between the country and the 
financing institutions. Id. More than sixty-six countries completed PRSPs between 2000 
and March 2009. Id. 
342. See Dickerson, supra note 335, at 56. "Some members of the financial 
community . . . contend that IMF lending creates a moral- hazard problem . . . knowingly 
lending to repressive regimes who illegally divert the loan process or use the funds in ways 
that affirmatively harm the countries' citizens." Id. Contrary to the effects of its 
implementation, the PRSPs were supposed to grant governments greater influence in 
"tripartite" discussions for loan forgiveness and redevelopment. MARC DARROW, BETWEEN 
LIGHT AND SHADOW: THE WORLD BANK, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, AND 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 289 (2006). This allows for the IMF and World Bank 
policy makers to take advantage of the developing countries' weakness, diverting 
government attention regarding obligations from citizens to the institutions. Id.; see Fergus 
MacKay, Universal Rights or a Universe unto Itself? Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights 
and the World Bank's Draft Operational Policy 4. JO on Indigenous Peoples, 17 AM. U. 
INT'L L. Rev. 527, 532- 33 (2002); Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The World Bank and the IMF 
Relationship- Quo Vadis, 35 INT'L LAW. 3549 (2001). However, it is been assessed most 
developing countries may not have the institutional capacity to conduct the necessary public 
consultations required for approval of a PRSP. Id.; see Rajesh Swaminathan, Regulating 
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resources for public services. 343 While urging priority in repayment of 
debts, the IMF urges low-income countries to adopt potentially 
cataclysmic policies. 344 
C. The Challenge of the G-20 
The Group of Twenty, otherwise known as G-20, is of a group of 
finance ministers and central bank governors from countries across the 
world initially dedicated to discussing and coordinating policies related 
to the stabilization and regulation of global financial markets, but which 
has recently broadened its agenda to include more general global 
economic governance issues.345 Established as a response to the 
financial crises of the late 1990s,346 the G-20 consists of selected both 
advanced and so-called "systemically significant" emerging 
economies.347 The G-20 functions as an informal forum, allowing for 
Development: Structural Adjustment and the Case for National Enforcement of Economic 
and Social Rights, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 161, 214 (1998). There are several 
operational issues regarding the inter- relational aspects of these structural policies and 
individual human rights standards. See id. 
343. See Goldberg, supra note 332, at 970 (furthering insight into why countries 
participating in the HIPC run into problems even with their participation in the program). 
HIPC debtor countries usually apportion their domestic investments toward infrastructure, 
such as providing electrical power, paving roads, and telephone connections instead of 
spending money toward health and education. See id. This form of neoliberal economic 
ideology has proven detrimental to certain countries. See Anup Shah, Structural Adjustment 
- A Major Cause of Poverty, GLOBAL ISSUES, (Oct. 29, 2008), available at 
http://www.globalissues.org/print/article/3 (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). Minimizing the role 
of the state, privatization, reduced protection of domestic industries, currency devaluation, 
increased interest rates, elimination of subsidies, reduction and removal of regulations to 
gain attraction from foreign investors are all parts if this ideology. See id. "Structural 
adjustments have . . . contributed to 'the greatest peacetime transfer of wealth from the 
periphery to the imperial center in history' ... without much media attention." Id. 
344. See KUNIBERT RAFFER, DEBT MANAGEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT: PROTECTION OF 
THE POOR AND THE MILLENIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 101 (2010). 
345. See Haque & Burdescue, supra note 315, at 241 ( explaining how leaders came to 
the Conference with the objective of establishing a framework for cooperation and 
assistance with alleviating poverty). See also What is the G20?, G20, available at 
http://www.g20.org/docs/about/about_ G20.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). 
346. See St. Petersburg Hosts the F20 Summit G- 20, 
http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). 
347. Id. The finance ministers and central bank governors hail from the European 
Union and the following nineteen countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, Republic of Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. Former 
Canadian Finance Minister (later, Prime Minister) is credited with proposing the G- 20. See 
John lbbitson & Tara Perkins, How Canada Made the G20 Happen, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 
(June 18, 2010, 4:09 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/how-canada-made-
the-g20-happen/article43227 67 /?page=all. 
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discussion between the participating developed and developing 
countries as to the promotion of global economic stability and 
development.348 The inaugural meeting of the G-20 took place in 
Berlin, Germany on December 15-16, 1999.349 Since then, the G-20 has 
held annual meetings, engaging in a dialogue about key economic issues 
and implementing various initiatives and reforms. 350 
Creation of the G-20 was premised in part on remedying the 
limited participation of key emerging developing economies in global 
economic discussion and govemance.351 Other forums discussing world 
economic issues preceded the G-20, and these "showed the potential 
benefits of a regular international consultative forum embracing the 
emerging-market countries."352 Building on these predecessors, the 
handpicked G-20 enabled a regular dialogue with a constant set of 
partners. 353 Reflecting the broad representation of the G-20, its member 
countries represent around ninety percent of global national product, 
eighty percent of world trade, and two-thirds of the world population.354 
However, critics of the Group of Twenty mention that it is essentially a 
self-appointed, elite group, and point to its corresponding lack of 
inclusiveness, accountability and, most importantly, political 
legitimacy. 355 
Because of the informal nature of the G-20, members can make 
comments, recommendations, and measures to be adopted. 356 There are 
348. See St. Petersburg Hosts the F20 Summit, supra note 346. 
349. Id. 
350. Id. The meetings are annual, but they are preceded by workshops, reports, case 
studies to provide ministers and governors with analysis and insight. Id. The 2011 G-20 
summit meeting took place on November 3-4, 2011, in Cannes, France. Id. 
351. See St. Petersburg Hosts the F20 Summit, supra note 346. 
352. Id. Before the G- 20 was created, there was a G- 22, G- 7, and even a G- 33. Id. 
These groups of leaders made proposals to deal with world economic issues. Id. The G- 7 
was established in 1976, comprised of major industrial economies including Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Id. 
The G- 7 also allows for discussion of current economic issues, but the discussion is geared 
toward the interests of the seven countries. Id. The G- 20, in contrast, reflects the diverse 
interests of the industrial and emerging-market economies. St. Petersburg Hosts the F20 




356. Id. Participation in the G- 20 meetings is limited to the members. St. Petersburg 
Hosts the F20 Summit, supra note 346. The limit is linked to ensuring the "effectiveness 
and continuity of [the G- 20's] activity. Id. Although the meetings are not open to the 
public, the public has access to discussions via a "communique" which the G- 20 publishes 
after each meeting. See G- 20 Publications, G- 20, 
http://www.g20.org/pub_communiques.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (providing record 
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no formal votes or resolutions.357 Instead, "[e]very G-20 member has 
one "voice" with which it can take an active part in G-20 activity."358 
There is no permanent staff; the chair, selected from a different regional 
group of countries each year, rotates on an annual basis. 359 The chair is 
part of a three-member management "Troika" of chairs. 360 
Financial ministers and central bank governors are not the only 
attendees at G-20 meeting.361 Also present at the meetings are 
important representatives of the BWis, namely the Managing Director 
of the IMF, the President of the World Bank, and the chairs of the 
International Monetary and Financing Committee and Development 
Committee of the IMF and World Bank. 362 This participation attempts 
to ensure that "the G-20 process is well integrated with the activities of 
the BWis."363 
Reform of the BWis has, indeed, been on the agenda of more than 
one G-20 meeting.364 Acknowledging the "vital role the [BWis] should 
play in promoting macroeconomic and financial stability, economic 
growth, and poverty reduction,"365 the G-20 concentrated in great part 
on governance reforms.366 Recognizing the evolution of the global 
of communiques). 
357. Id. There are no voting shares attached to the voting member, and voting power 
is not governed by the member's economic status. Id. 
358. Id. "To this extent the influence a country can exert is shaped decisively by its 
commitment." Id. 
359. The 2011 Chair is France. The G20, UNIV. OF TORONTO, available at 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/g20whatisit.html (last updated Sept. 28, 2011). Mexico will 
chair the G20 in 2012. Id. Starting in 2011, G- 20 summits will be held annually. Id. 
360. The 2011 Chair is France. G20 Information Centre, U. OF TORONTO, 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/ (last updated Sept. 10, 2013). Mexico will chair the G20 in 
2012. G- 20 Information Centre: The G20, http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/g20whatisit.html 
(last updated July 22, 2010). Starting in 2011, G- 20 summits will be held annually. Id. 
361. Id. 
362. Id. These participate on an ex-officio basis. Id. 
363. Id. The G- 20 also collaborates with the Financial Stability Board and the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. The G20, supra note 359. 
364. G20 Statement on Reforming Bretton Woods Institutions, Meeting of Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors in Xianghe (Oct. 16, 2005), available at 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2005/2005bwi.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) [hereinafter 
Statement on Reforming BWis]. 
365. Id. 
366. Id. The G- 20 also called for reinforcement of the cooperation between the BWis, 
and discussed their separate responsibilities. Id. The G- 20 emphasized that the IMF should 
focus on macroeconomic and financial stability, both nationally and internationally, on the 
surveillance of the global economy, and on strengthening crisis prevention. Id. As to the 
World Bank, the G-20 advised that it focus on development "sharpening its financial and 
technical assistance roles for both least- developed countries and emerging markets." 
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economy since the inception of the BWis, 367 the G-20's statement 
emphasized the need to have the governance structure of the BWis, with 
respect to both quotas and representation, reflect the changes in 
economic weight. " 368 
The 2005 Statement also addressed · management reforms. 369 The 
Statement suggested that the BWis work to enhance their "institutional 
effectiveness." advising that selection of senior management should be 
premised on merit and allow for broad representation of all member 
countries. 370 The G-20 also drew attention to lending practices, 
advising the BWis to "continue improving their lending frameworks," 
and to take measures to meet their members' financial needs. 371 
As has been indicated, the 2008 financial crisis gave the G-20 
forum a new dimension and promoted the G-20 to call for continued 
BWI reform. 372 By 2004, Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin wanted 
the G-20 to be not only a forum for finance ministers and central bank 
governors, but also one for the leaders of the governments.373 Martin's 
goal came to fruition as a result of the 2008 financial crisis, when then -
president George W. Bush decided to convene a meeting of world 
Statement on Reforming BWis, supra note 364. See also Communique, Meeting of Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors in Xianghe (Oct. 16, 2005), available at 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2005/2005communique.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) 
(reiterating support for reformation of the BWis and drawing attention to the importance of 
improving the governance, management, and operational strategies of the BWis). 
367. Specifically the growth in emerging markets and "deepened integration in 
industrialized countries." G- 20, Statement on Reforming the Bretton Woods Institution 




371. Id. The 2006 G- 20 meeting renewed discussion regarding the reform of the 
BWis. Communique, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Nov. 19, 
2006), available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2006/2006communique.html (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2013 ). At the meeting, members discussed the formula of a quota formula and how 
to implement it. Id. The members also agreed to further consider issues relating to IMF 
surveillance, the IMF's role in emerging market economies, and its role in low- income 
countries, as well as collaboration between the BWis. Id. The members called for the 
modernization and strengthening of IMF surveillance to "meet the needs of globalization." 
Id. Suggesting a possible weakness in the area of surveillance, the G- 20 addressed the 
strengthening of IMF surveillance as recently as 2011, noting G- 20 agreement on the need 
to further strengthen the effectiveness and coherence of bilateral and multilateral IMF 
surveillance. See Final Communique, Meeting of 020 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors in Wash. D.C. (Apr. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/201 l-finance-l 10415-en.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
372. See Ibbitson & Perkins, supra note 347; What is the G20, 020, available at 
http://www.g20.org/docs/about/about_G20.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2013). 
373. Ibbitson & Perkins, supra note 347; What is the G20, supra note 372. 
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leaders to deal with the crisis. 374 The Bush administration gathered the 
world leaders by turning to the G-20 countries.375 The result was the G-
20 Summit, which convened on November 15, 2008 and featured a 
gathering of both finance ministers and political leaders. 376 
Notwithstanding its lack of inclusiveness (and legitimacy), the 
Washington, D.C. summit has been billed by some as the "Bretton 
Woods 2" meeting for its emphasis on reform of the BWis. 377 After the 
Summit, the G-20 issued a declaration setting forth reforms to be 
implemented in response to the ongoing financial crisis.378 The G-20 
announced an action plan designed to respond to the crisis, noting five 
categories of reform and characterizing the measures to be taken in each 
category as either "immediate" or "medium term."379 One of the 
categories of reform was the reform of international financial 
institutions. 380 Recognizing the plight of developing economies as to 
financing, the G-20 expressed approval of the IMF's new short-term 
liquidity facility and urged the "ongoing review of its instruments and 
facilities to ensure flexibility."381 As to the World Bank, the G-20 
encouraged full-capacity use of its development agenda, approving the 
introduction of new facilities by the World Bank in the area of 
infrastructure and trade finance. 382 The G-20 expressed its intent to act 
to "[ e ]nsure that the [BWis] ... have sufficient resources to continue 
374. Ibbitson & Perkins, supra note 347; What is the G20, supra note 372. 
375. Ibbitson & Perkins, supra note 347; What is the G20, supra note 372. 
376. Ibbitson & Perkins, supra note 347; What is the G20, supra note 372. Since then, 
the leaders of the G-20 nations have held summits semi-annually or annually. Id. Summits 
were held in London and Pittsburg in 2009. Id. Summits were also held in Toronto and 
Seoul in 2010. Id. 
377. G20 Heads of State Meeting I 5th November 2008: Summary and Analysis of 
Washington Meeting, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT (Nov. 17 2008), available at 
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2008/1 l/art-562975/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2013). 
378. Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy (Nov. 
15, 2008), available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2008/2008declarationl 115.html (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
379. Id. 
380. Id. The IMF and World Bank were the focus of this category of reform. Id. The 
other categories of reform were: strengthening transparency and accountability; enhancing 
sound regulation; promoting integrity in financial markets; and reinforcing international 
cooperation. Id. The proposed reforms were separated into five categories: ( 1) strengthening 
transparency and accountability; (2) enhancing sound regulation; (3) promoting integrity in 
financial markets; (4) reinforcing international cooperation; (5) reforming international 
financial institutions. Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World 
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playing their role in overcoming the crisis. "383 
The November declaration emphasized the state of developing and 
emerging economies in urging BWI reform. 384 The G-20 tied BWI 
reform to these countries, noting its commitment to the BWis' reform 
"so that they can more adequately reflect changing economic weights in 
the world economy .... " 85 It called for International Financial 
Institutions to review and adapt their lending instruments to meet their 
members' needs, and also called for the consideration of ways to 
"restore emerging and developing countries' access to credit and resume 
private capital flows which are critical for sustainable growth and 
development, including ongoing infrastructure investment."386 The G-
20 once again addressed the issue of surveillance, noting that the IMF 
should conduct "vigorous and even-handed surveillance reviews of all 
countries ... "387 Elaborating on another weakness in IMF operations, 
the G-20 stated the BWI's role in providing macro-financial policy 
advice would be strengthened if it gave greater attention to the financial 
sectors of all countries and better integrated the reviews with the joint 
IMF/World Bank financial sector assessment programs. "388 
IMF operations were once again a source of discussion during the 
April 2009 G-20 Summit, which took in place in London.389 In a 
declaration issued after the Summit, G-20 leaders noted the continued 
need to reinforce international financial institutions, "particularly the 
IMF."390 To that end, the G-20 pledged to make available $850 billion 
in resources through the global financial institutions "to support growth 
m emerging market and developing countries by helping to finance 
383. Id. 
384. See id. 
385. Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, supra 
note 378. The G20 also noted that the FSF should expand to a broad membership of 
emerging economies. Id. 
386. Id. 
387. Id. 
388. Id. The G- 20 also addressed crisis response, emphasizing the need for the IMF to 
collaborate with the FSF and other bodies in an effort to "better identify vulnerabilities, 
anticipate potential stresses, and act swiftly to play a key role in crisis response." 
Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, supra note 378. 
Part of the action plan was for the IMF, in conjunction with the expanded FSF and other 
regulators and bodies, to develop recommendations to "mitigate pro-cyclicality, including 
the review of how valuation and leverage, bank capital, executive compensation, and 
provisioning practices may exacerbate cyclical trends." Id. 
389. Communique, Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, Statement Issued by the 
G20 Leaders (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0402.html 
[hereinafter Global Plan for Recovery and Reform] . 
390. Id. 
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counter-cyclical spending, bank recapitalization, infrastructure, trade 
finance, balance of payments support, debt rollover, and social 
support."391 The G-20 agreed to increase the resources available to the 
IMF through immediate financing of $250 billion from members, and 
announced its support for a substantial increase in lending of at least 
$100 billion by the multilateral development banks, specifically to low 
income countries. 392 Many of these same topics were revisited and 
reiterated at the November 2011 summit meeting in Cannes, France. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the promotion of neo-liberal policies by the BWis, over the 
last decade or so developed countries have hypocritically instituted 
various government actions and regulations. For instance, on 
September 8, 2008, the United States government bailed out and took 
over the nation's largest mortgage buyer, The Federal National 
Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), along with the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"), after the two mortgage 
giants struggled with deep losses and investors had lost confidence in 
them. 393 Amid an economic recession, and shortly after the fall of 
391. Id. Counter-cyclical spending is a fiscal policy characterized by an increase in 
government expenditures that is meant to jumpstart economic recovery. Martin Khor, 
Reality Behind the Hype ofG20 Summit, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (Apr. 6, 2009), available 
at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/gtrends/gtrends246.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
Programs that automatically expand fiscal policy during recessions, and contract it during 
booms, are one form of countercyclical fiscal policy. David N. Weil, Fiscal Policy, THE 
CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECON., available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/FiscalPolicy.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). 
Additionally, bank recapitalization refers to the restructuring of a troubled bank with the 
assistance of a deposit insurance fund. Business Definition for: Recapitalization, ALL Bus., 
available at http://www.allbusiness.com/glossaries/recapitalization/4954442-1.html (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2013) Debt rollover refers to the rolling over of existing debt into new debt 
when the existing debt is about to mature. Rollover Risk, INVESTOPEDIA, available at 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rollover-risk.asp#axzz1Zls25wls (last visited Nov. 7, 
2013). The IMF defines balance of payments as a: 
statistical statement that systematically summarizes, for a specific time period, the 
economic transactions of an economy with the rest of the world. Transactions, for 
the most part between residents and nonresidents, consist of those involving goods, 
services, and income; those involving financial claims on, and liabilities to, the rest 
of the world; and those (such as gifts) classified as transfers, which involve 
offsetting entries to balance-in an accounting sense- one-sided transactions. 
INT'L MONETARY FUND, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL 6, available at 
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sta/bop/bopman.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2103). 
392. Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, supra note 389. 
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Lehman Brothers,394 the American International Group (the "AIG") was 
suffering from a liquidity crisis when its credit ratings were downgraded 
in September 2008.395 Fearing the catastrophic consequences of AIG 
filing for bankruptcy, on September 16, 2008, the Federal Reserve 
Board announced that it would authorize the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York to lend up to $85 billion to AIG.396 
In 2008, the United States automotive industry was facing financial 
downturn partially linked to a substantial increase in the prices of 
automotive fuels. 97 General Motors and Chrysler were given large 
government bailouts to support them through this crisis while Ford was 
given an open credit line. 3 8 However, due to poor management and 
org (last visited Oct. 25, 2013); see Freddie Mac, N.Y. TIMES, available at 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/freddie_mac/index.html?inline=nyt-
org (last visited Oct. 25, 2013); see also Charles Duhigg, As Crisis Grew, a Few Options 
Shrank to One, N.Y. TIM ES (Sept. 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/08/business/08takeover.html?_r=2&hp=&pagewanted=all 
&oref=slogin (last visited Oct. 25, 2013) ("The downfall of Fannie and Freddie stems from 
a series of miscalculations and deferred decisions, both by their executives and government 
officials, according to company insiders, regulators, auditors and outside analysts."). 
394. See John Cassidy, Anatomy of a Meltdown: Ben Bernanke and the Financial 
Crisis, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 1, 2008), available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/12/0l/08120lfa_fact_cassidy?currentPage=all 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2013); Sam Mamudi, Lehman Folds with Record $613 Billion Debt, 
MARKET WATCH (Sept 15, 2008), available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/lehman-
folds-with-record-613-billion-debt?siteid=rss (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). Lehman Brothers, 
a Wall Street investment bank, filed for bankruptcy protection in 2008. Id. The bankruptcy 
was the largest in history, with a total of $613 billion in debt against $639 billion in assets, 
effectively ending the company's 158-year existence. Id. 
395. See William Greider, The AIG Bailout Scandal, THE NATION (Aug. 6, 2010), 
available at http://www.thenation.com/article/153929/aig-bailout-scandal?page=full (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2013); see also Jim Puzzanghera, AIG Bailout is 'Poisonous '; Taxpayers 
Risk 'Severe Losses,' Panel Says, L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2010), available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/201 O/jun/11/business/la-fi-aig-bailout-20100611 (last visited Oct. 
25, 2013) (referring to the bailout as a $182-billion bailout, and noting lack of clarity as to 
whether taxpayers ever will be fully repaid). 
396. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 16, 2008), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080916a.htm (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2013); Pam Selvarajah, The AIG Bailout and A/G's Prospects/or Repaying 
Government Loans, 29 Rev. BANKING & FIN. L. 363, 364 (2010) (noting that the loan carried 
a twenty-four month term). 
397. See Gas Prices Put Detroit Big Three in Crisis Mode, NBC NEWS (June 1, 2008), 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24896359/ns/business-autos/t/gas-prices-put-
detroit-big-three-crisis-mode/#.TsBwSMPNltM (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
398. See David Shepardson, Rattner Applauds Auto Bailouts' 'Happy Ending', 1853 
CHAIRMAN (Nov. 1, 2011), available at http://www.1853chairman.com/2011/11/0l/rattner-
applauds-auto-bailouts%E2%80%99-%E2%80%98happy-ending%E2%80%99/ (noting that 
the Treasury extended Chrysler a $12.5 billion bailout, $11.3 billion of which has been 
recovered, and extended General Motors a $49.5 billion bailout, of which $23.2 billion has 
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business practices, General Motors and Chrysler still filed for Chapter 
11 Bankruptcy in 2009.399 Having emerged from bankruptcy, the 
United States federal government now holds nearly 61 % of the new 
company.400 
The United States has not been the only developed country to 
institute the type of hypocritical policies described above. Currently 
facing an economic debt crisis, Europe has been urged to begin bailing 
out its banks.401 The recommendation to do so came directly from the 
IMF's managing director, Christine Legarde.402 In agreement with the 
bailout, the first major European bank bailout of 2011 occurred when 
the governments of both France and Belgium pledged to participate in a 
rescue plan for their banking giant Dexia. 4 3 The plan is to place 
Dexia's "toxic assets, including Greek and other peripheral euro zone 
government bonds" into a government-supported "bad-bank."404 Bank 
of France Governor and G20 member, Christian Noyer, has stated "[w]e 
will loan Dexia as much as it needs."405 
As developed countries begin to institute actions contradictory to 
neo-liberal policies, maybe the BWis will begin to recognize the harm 
of forcing neo-liberal policies on developing countries; however, it 
should not be forgotten that, in the final analysis, the general policies of 
these institutions are set by member states' s governments, not by the 
secretariat bureaucracy. Newly-elected Managing Director Christine 
been recovered). "At current trading prices, the Treasury would lose more than $13 billion 
on its GM bailout." Id. 
399. See Automotive Industry Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, available at 
http ://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/ subjects/ cl credit_ crisis/ auto_ industry/in 
<lex.html (last updated May 25, 2011). 
400. Id. The Canadian government, a health care trust for the United Auto Workers 
Union, and bondholders own the balance. Id. 
401. Heather Stewart, Jill Treanor & Dominic Rushe, IMF Chief Tells Europe: You 
Must Bail Out the Banks Again, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, .2011), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011 /sep/22/imf-chief-europe-bail-out-banks (last visited 
Oct 25, 2013). 
402. Id. (discussing Lagarde's call for action). 
403. Philip Blenkinsop & Robert-Jan Bartunek, Dexia Bailout Set as Wider Bank 
Rescue Mulled, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2011), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/09/us-dexia-idUSTRE7962XE20111009 (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2013). Dexia used short-term funding to finance long-term lending, and had 
difficulty obtaining credit as the European debt crisis worsened. Id. 
404. John O'Donnell & Illona Wissenbach, EU Preparing Bank Rescues Amid Greece 
Doubts, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2011), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/04/us-
eurozone-idUSTRE79211720111004 (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
405. Alexandria Sage, France's Noyer Says Will Ensure Dexia Liquidity, REUTERS 
(Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/05/france-dexia-noyer-
idUSP6E7KCOIN20111005 (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
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Lagarde has shown promise with her actions in trying to move towards 
a more balanced approach (to the degree that she can). After edging out 
the Bank of Mexico's governor Agustin Carstens,406 the former Finance 
Minister of France took over the top post at the IMF in the midst of 
global economic turmoil. Ms. Lagarde won the support of a several 
economic powers including China, Russia, and the United States with 
the promise to bring "reform" to the IMF. 407 
The most prominent reform pledged by Ms. Lagarde was to 
increase the presence of emerging economies at the IMF. Several 
emerging markets leaders voiced concern over the election of yet 
another European to head the IMF, something that has not changed 
since its inception in 1944.408 Ms. Lagarde was able to curtail 
complaints through assurance that the interests of emerging markets 
would be represented under her leadership.409 To show her 
commitment, Ms. Lagarde created a fourth deputy managing director 
position and appointed Chinese economist Zhu Min to the position. 
Cornell University Professor Eswar S. Prassar hailed the move as a 
"grand bargain" in that Europeans were able to keep control of the top 
job at the IMF while emerging markets were able to gain more of a 
voice with the appointment.410 
Even with a promising new managing director, massive changes to 
the BWis are still unlikely. The policies of the BWis flow from ideals, 
positions and interests of developed countries. The core structure of the 
BWis gives the voice of developed countries more weight than 
developing countries because the BWis are fundamentally a corporation 
406. Press Release No. 11/259, Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Selects 
Christine Lagarde as Managing Director (June 28, 2011) ( on file with author), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/prl 1259.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
407. See US Backs Christine Lagarde as Next Head of IMF, THE TELEGRAPH (June 28, 
2011 ), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/dominique-strauss-
kahn/8603421 /US-backs-Christine-Lagarde-as-next-head-of-IMF .html (last visited Oct. 25, 
2013). 
408. See Liz Alderman, France 's Lagarde Selected as I.MF. Managing Director, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.nytimes.corn/2011 /06/29/business/global/29fund.html?pagewanted=all. (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
409. See Liz Alderman & Keith Bradsher, Emerging Nations Warm to Lagarde for 
I.MF. Role, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011 /06/08/business/global/08fund.html?pagewanted=all (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
410. Binyamin Appelbaum, I.MF. 's New Chief Names American and Chinese 
Deputies, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2013), available at 
http://www.nytimes.corn/2011 /07 I 13/business/us-and-chinese-officials-named-to-imf-
posts.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
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with developed countries controlling its Board of Directors as majority 
shareholders. Naturally, the actions of the corporation are for the 
benefit of its shareholders. Without a major redevelopment to the core 
structure of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
developed countries will continue to favor neo-liberal policies as they 
open the economies of these developing countries to the benefit of 
developed countries, despite contradictory actions within their own 
countries. 
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